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Article 6

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-UNIVERSIDAD
CENTRAL DE BAYAMON
V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: JURISDICTION OVER RELIGIOUS COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-THE NEED FOR SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS

In UniversidadCentral de Bayamon v. National LaborRelations Board,I the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit refused to enforce a
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) order requiring a
Catholic university to bargain with a faculty union. The United States
Supreme Court's confusing treatment of the first amendment religion
clauses and the circuit court's inability to agree on the proper application
of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago2 prompted the First Circuit's evenly
split decision.
Part I of this comment discusses the Supreme Court's decision in
Catholic Bishop. Part II summarizes the First Circuit's application of that
decision to the facts of Universidad Central. Part III argues that Catholic
Bishop should not apply to UniversidadCentral and therefore reviews applicable Supreme Court interpretations of the religion clauses. Part IV refutes the excessive entanglement arguments proposed by the First
Circuit in Universidad Central. Part V concludes that the First Circuit
should have permitted NLRB jurisdiction over the faculty at Universidad
Central de Bayamon.
I.

NLRB Jurisdiction Over Religious Schools:
NLRB v. CatholicBishop of Chicago
Attempting to promote industrial peace in interstate commerce,
Congress in 1935 enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or
Act). 3 The Act encouraged the formation of the labor union, which was
to be the voice for the individual worker in labor/management relations.
The NLRB, empowered to enforce the Act,4 began in 1975 to assert jurisdiction over Catholic secondary school employers. 5 In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,6 however, the United States Supreme Court
restricted the exercise of NLRB jurisdiction over lay teachers in two Roman Catholic parochial schools because it saw a "significant risk" of in7
fringing on the establishment clause of the first amendment.
In CatholicBishop, ChiefJustice Burger's majority opinion focused on
the function of the parochial school teacher and noted:
In recent decisions involving aid to parochial schools we have rec1 793 F.2d 383 (1st Cir. 1986).
2
3
4
5

440 U.S. 490 (1979).
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982).
See Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975).

6 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
7 Id. at 502.
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ognized the critical and unique role of the teacher in fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school. What we said of the schools in
Lemon v. Kurtzman is true of the schools in this case: "Religious authority necessarily pervades the school system." The key role played by
teachers in such a school has been the predicate for our conclusions
that governmental aid channeled through the teachers creates an impermissible risk of excessive governmental
entanglement in the affairs
8
of the church-operated schools.
Rather than confront the "serious First Amendment questions that
would follow ...from the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over teachers
in church-operated schools," 9 the Court chose a construction of the jurisdiction section of the NLRA 10 that would permit it to avoid resolving
the case on constitutional grounds. 1 The Court found "no clear expression of an affirmative intention of Congress that teachers in church-operated schools should be covered by the Act."' 2 Accordingly, the Court
held that the NLRB lacked statutory authority under the NLRA to exercise jurisdiction over the teachers in these "church-operated schools."' 3
II.

Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB

In November 1979, the full-time faculty of Universidad Central de
8 Id. at 501 (citations omitted).
9 Id. at 504.
10 The NLRA does not explicitly list which employees it covers. Rather, it purports to protect
the rights of all employees except those that fall within an exception. Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1982), states: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing ....
Section 2(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982), defines "employee" as "any employee"
except:
[A]ny individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act...
or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
Finally, § 2(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982), states that "employer" also means "any
person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly .... " and concludes with exceptions
to the broad "employer" category. Besides the employees specifically excluded from coverage
under § 152(3), the only employees not covered are those who work for:
[T]he United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve
Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway
Labor Act ...or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone
acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
11 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 500. The Court cited Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), in which ChiefJustice Marshall held that the courts ought not construe an
Act of Congress to be unconstitutional if any other construction is possible. However, Justice Brennan, joined byJustices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented in Catholic Bishop, arguing that "the
interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act announced by the Court today is not 'fairly possible.' " Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 511. Brennan urged:
[T]he Act covers all employers not within the eight express exceptions. The Court today
substitutes amendment for construction to insert one more exception-for church-operated
schools. This is a particularly transparent violation of the judicial role: The legislative history reveals that Congress itself considered and rejected a very similar amendment.
Id. The dissentingJustices noted that in adopting the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress refused to
accept a provision that would have excluded from the term "employer" those organizations operated exclusively for "religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes." Id. at 513
(emphasis omitted).
12 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504.
13 Id. at 507.
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Bayamon in Bayamon, Puerto Rico formed a union. The "Union de
Profesores Universitarios" sought certification from the NLRB. After the
required hearings and an election, the Board certified the union. The
university, however, refused to bargain with the union, claiming it had no
obligation to do so. The union responded by filing an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.14 At the subsequent NLRB proceeding, the
university defended on the ground that it was exempt from the requirements of the NLRA because of the Supreme Court's holding in NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago.15
The NLRB administrative law judge rejected the university's defense
and ordered it to bargain with the union.1 6 Thejudge believed that Catholic Bishop was not controlling because, unlike the parochial high school
defendant in that case, Universidad Central de Bayamon was neither
church controlled nor pervasively sectarian. The judge also relied on
NLRB decisions limiting application of Catholic Bishop to "parochial elementary and secondary schools."' 7 On review a three-member appellate
panel of the NLRB, citing CatholicBishop, exempted the university's seminary from NLRA coverage, but affirmed the administrative law judge's
decision in all other respects.' 8
The NLRB subsequently sought an order from the First Circuit to
enforce its decision. After hearing the case en banc, 19 the circuit court
split on the proper application of the Catholic Bishop holding to the facts
of Universidad Central. Because no majority position could be reached,
20
the First Circuit denied the NLRB request for an enforcement order.
The court filed two opinions differing on the proper reading of Catholic Bishop. Judge Breyer wrote the opinion denying the NLRB request
for enforcement. 2 1 According to Judge Breyer, the crucial issue in
UniversidadCentral was whether Catholic Bishop applied to church-operated
colleges as well as parochial preparatory schools. 2 2 Based on four factors, Judge Breyer concluded that Catholic Bishop applied to this
university.
First, Judge Breyer argued that the language of Catholic Bishop made
no distinction between colleges and lower institutions of learning. 23 The
Supreme Court simply referred to the general category of religiously af14 Universidad Central de Bayamon, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (1984).
15 440 U.S. 490. The University also claimed that its employees were managerial in nature and
thus exempt under NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), aft'd, 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
16 UniversidadCentral, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 138, at 1.
17 See Barber-Scotia College, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 406 (1979) (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971)) (allowed public aid to religiously affiliated universities on the basis that they were
significantly different from church-related elementary and secondary schools, and did not present
the same first amendment problems). See also Lewis Univ., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (1982); Duquesne
Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 261 N.L.R.B. No. 587 (1982); Thiel College, 261 N.L.R.B. No. 580 (1982);
College of Notre Dame, 245 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (1979).
18 Universidad Central, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 138, at 3-4.
19 A three judge panel voted 2-1 for enforcement, but the full court vacated that order and
reheard the case en banc, see FED. R. App. P. 35(a); six judges sat on the en banc panel in light of a
senior circuit judge sitting, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1976).
20 Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 399.
21 ChiefJudge Campbell and Judge Torruella joined Judge Breyer's opinion.
22 Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 401.
23 Id.
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filiated "schools" as being affected by its decision. 24 Because the Catholic
Bishop Court purportedly based its holding on an interpretation of the
NLRA, and used no limiting language in the opinion, Judge Breyer saw
no reason for limiting the Court's holding to preparatory schools.
Second, Judge Breyer indicated that the true reason for the result
reached in Catholic Bishop was the Court's fear that the state would become impermissibly entangled with religion. 25 Addressing this concern,
Judge Breyer declared that the risk of state entanglement with religion in
a university setting was just as substantial as it was in the preparatory
school context of Catholic Bishop. Such entanglement might occur, according to Judge Breyer, if the religiously affiliated college dismissed a
teacher allegedly for religious reasons and the teacher filed an unfair labor practice complaint. He believed that in such a situation the NLRB
would be forced to determine whether the dismissal was for religious reasons or was actually an unfair labor practice. Not only would such a substantive determination infringe on first amendment guarantees but the
mere process of inquiry into university practices and "allegedly religious
26
motive[s]" would bring the Board into conflict with religious authority.
Accordingly, because the first amendment concerns in Catholic Bishop
were just as apparent to Judge Breyer in the facts of UniversidadCentral,
he believed that Catholic Bishop exempted the university from NLRB
jurisdiction.27
Next, according to Judge Breyer, failure to apply Catholic Bishop to
universities would undercut the very purpose and rationale behind that
case. The Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop rejected the NLRB's argument that there should be a distinction between "completely religious
schools," such as a seminary for training clergy, and schools that are
"merely religiously associated," such as a parochial high school where
religious training per se is not the primary function. 28 Judge Breyer
noted that the inquiry process needed to determine whether a school was
"completely religious" would force the regulatory body to intrude into
the university's religious affairs. Such a result would create the state enwith religion that Catholic Bishop expressly attempted to
tanglement
29
avoid.
24 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 507.
25 UniversidadCentral, 793 F.2d at 401.
26 Id. See also Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502. The NLRB investigation of unfair labor practice
charges, for example, would require the Board to question the clergy-administrators and inquire
into the religious motives behind employment decisions. But see infra text accompanying footnotes
115-30.
27 Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 401. Judge Breyer noted that theological and philosophical
issues are more likely to arise in an educational institution than in another church-run enterprise,
such as a hospital or farm, because of the mission to educate students on moral issues. In this
mannerJudge Breyer rebutted the argument that CatholicBishop should not be extended to colleges
because it does not apply to all other church-run operations, especially since propagation of the faith
is at least one of the missions of the university, which is not true of all church operations. Id. at 402.
But see infra text accompanying notes 131-32.
28 Id. The Supreme Court rejected this argument because such a distinction was too simplistic
to provide a workable guide for the exercise ofjurisdiction. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 495.
29 Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 401-02. This argument seems to presuppose that Catholic
Bishop was decided on constitutional grounds, a reading that ChiefJustice Burger in Catholic Bishop
expressly disavows. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502.
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Finally, Judge Breyer distinguished the cases relied on by the NLRB.
The cases cited by the Board"0 dealt with federal financial aid to religious
schools and drew a distinction between preparatory and collegiate levels
of education. Judge Breyer argued that concerns about the promotion of
religion through financial aid differ fundamentally from problems of interference through labor board regulation. Judge Breyer maintained
that the issuance of financial aid does not precipitate the type of federal
regulation that attends the assertion of NLRB jurisdiction. Financial aid
to a religiously affiliated college could be channelled specifically into
nonreligious areas while regulations governing labor/management relations would necessarily impact on both religious and nonreligious aspects of the college. Consequently, NLRB regulation would necessarily
require the regulatory board to intrude into all areas of the college,
whether religious or secular. 3 1
Because Judge Breyer determined that the Catholic Bishop exemption
from NLRB jurisdiction must apply to religious universities as well as
elementary and secondary schools, the only question remaining was
whether Universidad Central de Bayamon qualified as a "religious
school." Several factors suggested to Judge Breyer that the university
was religiously controlled. The Dominican Order of the Roman Catholic
church founded the university and continued to use it as part of an integrated educational system throughout Puerto Rico including elementary
and secondary schools operated by the Dominicans. The Catholic
church retained administrative control over the university. The President
of the university and a majority of the Board of Trustees were required to
be Dominican priests, as were a majority of the Executive Committee.
The administration had near absolute control over the university, much
more so than at most universities. The faculty possessed very little
power. Under such a managerial structure, the clergy-administrators
were in a position to control virtually all aspects of university life. 32
Additionally, in accordance with an agreement between the university, the Archdiocese of Puerto Rico, and the educational office of the
Catholic Church in Rome, the university had declared that, in addition to
its mission of secular education, it actively promoted the tenets of the
Catholic faith.3 3 The university held itself out as a Catholic university,
encouraged religious observance among its students, and reserved the
right to discipline members of the faculty for "offenses to the Christian
morality."3 4 It also required all students to take courses in theology and
philosophy taught from a "Catholic orientation." 35
30 Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
31 UniversidadCentral, 793 F.2d at 402. Judge Breyer also noted that NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444
U.S. 672 (1980), stands for the proposition that a university may receive federal aid and yet still be
beyond the reach of the labor laws. 793 F.2d at 403.
32 Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 399-400, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 138 at 11.
33 The role of the Bishop, the governing local official of the Catholic Church, was limited, however, to purely religious matters. Universidad Central, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 138 at 7.
34 Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 400.
35 Id. Neither teachers nor students must be Catholic, and no religious activity is required. Id. at
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After considering these factors, Judge Breyer found that the university had a primarily secular mission, but remained a religious institution.
As such, he argued that Catholic Bishop must be applied to the Universidad
Central case, that the university was therefore exempt from the operation
of the NLRA, and that enforcement of the NLRB order must be denied.
Three judges of the en banc panel disagreed with Judge Breyer's
interpretation of Catholic Bishop and voted to enforce the NLRB order.
Writing for this group, 36 Judge Coffin argued that the Supreme Court
based its holding in Catholic Bishop on the critical role of the teacher in
parochial elementary and secondary schools.3 7 Judge Coffin believed
that Catholic Bishop held that teachers at parochial preparatory schools
were essentially servants of the church, and therefore exempt from the
Act, because of the church-related nature of their responsibilities. Judge
Coffin's opinion emphasized the secondary school teacher's crucial role
in propagating the faith and stressed that such propagation was an integral element of his or her teaching duties. 38 Thus, the establishment of a
union at such a parochial preparatory school would impermissibly inject
39
government into the day-to-day operation of religion.
Judge Coffin characterized the controlling issue as whether the
teachers seeking to unionize at the university performed the same role
that the high school teachers fulfilled in Catholic Bishop. This approach,
like the one used by the Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop, focused the
inquiry on the religious nature of the employee, rather than merely the
religious nature of the employer. Using such an approach and relying
heavily on a line of Supreme Court cases distinguishing between federal
aid to colleges and federal aid to preparatory schools,Judge Coffin found
that university and parochial school teachers did not perform similar
40
roles.
Judge Coffin noted the Supreme Court's distinction in Tilton v. Richardson,4 1 a case upholding a grant of money to a church-sponsored college in which the Court stated that there were "significant differences
between the religious aspects of church related institutions of higher
36 Judge Bownes and Senior Circuit Judge Aldrich joined Judge Coffin's opinion.
37 "The key role played by teachers in such a [church-operated] school system has been the
predicate for our conclusions .... Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501.
38 Propagating the faith has been described as the "raison d'etre of parochial schools." Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 404 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 628 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
39 The state would impermissibly intrude into religion because mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining include terms and conditions of employment. Consequently, the NLRB would necessarily assume jurisdiction over the actions of the clergy-administrators. As one court stated:
"mandatory collective bargaining, regardless of how narrowly the scope of negotiation is defined,
necessarily represents an encroachment upon the formerly autonomous position of management."
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 504, 337 A.2d
262, 267 (1975).
40 The NLRB asserted several reasons why Universidad Central should not have been treated as
a Catholic university. The NLRB noted that hiring standards at the university are the same as at
most nonreligious colleges, and these standards do not consider religion. The NLRB also pointed
out that teachers at the university are not expected to propagate the faith. UniversidadCentral, 793
F.2d at 404.
41 403 U.S. 672 (1972). See also Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985) and
cases cited supra note 17.
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learning and parochial elementary and secondary schools."'4 2 In reaching his decision, Judge Coffin also noted the higher degree of academic
43
freedom present at colleges.
Judge Coffin criticized the other panel for reading Catholic Bishop so
broadly. 44 Based on the difference in the role of the teachers at this university from that of the secondary school teachers in Catholic Bishop,
Judge Coffin concluded that the Catholic Bishop exemption should not be
extended to the teachers' union at Universidad Central, and that the
45
NLRB order should have been enforced.
III.
A.

Analysis of Universidad Central

The Inapplicabilityof Catholic Bishop

Judge Breyer concluded that Catholic Bishop held that the first
amendment bars NLRB jurisdiction over religious schools in general. As
Judge Coffin pointed out, however, Catholic Bishop does not per se prevent the NLRB from asserting jurisdiction in this context. Rather, on its
facts, Catholic Bishop only bars NLRB jurisdiction over teachers in religious elementary and secondary schools. 4 6 In Catholic Bishop, the Court
did not consider university faculties. The Court has noted, however, that
university teachers provide a form of education that differs substantially
from that provided in a parochial school because "the 'affirmative if not
dominant policy' of the instruction in pre-college church schools is 'to
assure future adherents to a particular faith by having control of their
total education at an early age.' -47
42 Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686.
43 UniversidadCentral, 793 F.2d at 404.
44 Judge Coffin's opinion argued that moral and theological disputes between the NLRB and the
religious administration could just as easily arise in other religious institutions, such as hospitals or
farms. Judge Coffin cited the example of the moral issue of abortion counseling at religious hospitals. If the Supreme Court decision is read as expansively as Judge Breyer reads it, according to
Judge Coffin, it follows that these other institutions should also be affected by the decision in Catholic
Bishop. This result would run contrary to the decisions of other circuit courts of appeals that have
extended NLRBjurisdiction to many other religious institutions since Catholic Bishop. See, e.g., Volunteers of America-Minnesota-Bar None Boys Ranch v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 345 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 3502 (1985)(children's center); Denver Post of the Volunteers of Am. v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 769
(10th Cir. 1984)(temporary care centers); St. Elizabeth's Hosp. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir.
1983) (hospital); St. Elizabeth Community Hosp. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1982) (hospital);
Tressler Lutheran Home for Children v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1982) (children's home).
45 UniversidadCentral, 793 F.2d at 405-06.
46 The Court in Catholic Bishop refers to church-operated schools as "parochial schools." 440
U.S. at 502 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 628 (1971)). A parochial school is defined
as "an elementary or high school maintained and operated by a religious organization." RANDOM
HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 968 (rev. ed. 1982). Other sources define parochial school as "a school
maintained by a religious body [usually] for elementary instruction." WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1643 (1976). Some Catholic Bishop commentators, however, interpret the confusing language to mean that the statutory exemption created by the opinion applies to the entire
school, not just to the teachers. See, e.g., A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON

LABOR LAW 96 (1986): "To the excluded categories of employers specifically listed in the Act, the
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, has added secondary schools operated by the Roman Catholic
Church."; Note, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop: Lay Teachers Seek More Than Good Shepherd to Protect Their
Rights, 32 MERCER L. REV. 655, 660 (1981): "[Tjhe NLRA was not intended to extend to religiously
operated schools .... If these readings are correct, even janitors or cafeteria workers who are not
involved in religious indoctrination would be denied protection under the NLRA.
47 Tilton, 403 U.S. at 685-86 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970)). The
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In addition, the Court decided Catholic Bishop on the basis of congressional intent, not constitutional doctrine. Through this holding, the
Court created a limited exception-for parochial school teachers-to the
broad coverage of the Act, and ignored the fact that Congress intended
to protect the bargaining rights of all employees not specifically excluded.4 8 Judge Breyer would extend the Supreme Court's questionable
statutory construction to religiously affiliated colleges or universities
without examining Congress' intent as to such schools. But when the
Supreme Court narrowly construes a statute, it is a mistake to apply the
construction broadly. Therefore, courts should not cloak universities in
the blanket NLRA exception that Catholic Bishop provided to parochial
schools.
Instead, when confronted with an assertion of NLRB jurisdiction
over the faculty at a religiously affiliated college or university, courts
must rule on the basis of the substantive constitutional analysis tradition49
ally required under the religion clauses of the first amendment.
B. ConstitutionalAnalysis
The religion clauses of the first amendment impose two distinct restrictions on governmental activity. 50 One restriction, embodied in the
free exercise clause, prohibits the government from impeding or burdening an individual in the free exercise of his religion. 51 The other restriction, embodied in the establishment clause, provides that the federal
government cannot advance one religion over another or actively support religion in general. 52 Because these restrictions are independent,
Court also noted that "there is substance to the contention that college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination" than elementary or secondary school students.
Tilton, 404 U.S. at 686.
48 See supra note 10.
49 Furthermore, while the Catholic Bishop majority maintained that it was not resolving the issue
of whether NLRB jurisdiction would result in an unconstitutional government entanglement in the
affairs of religious schools, the Court in dicta engaged in sufficient constitutional analysis for it to
have concluded that an extension ofjurisdiction to such schools would have given rise to "serious
First Amendment questions." Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504. In Catholic High School Ass'n v.
Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit addressed state labor relations board
jurisdiction over parochial schools. Not bound by the National Labor Relations Board decision in
Catholic Bishop, the Second Circuit answered the question avoided by the Supreme Court in Catholic
Bishop and held that New York State Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over parochial schools did
not violate the first amendment. Because UniversidadCentral and similar cases should not be decided
on the basis of the CatholicBishop precedent, the question of NLRB jurisdiction over religious college
or university faculty can be resolved only by determining whether there are any first amendment
barriers to the Board's exercise of its jurisdiction in this arena. See infra note 100. As to the extent of
NLRB jurisdiction, see infra notes 83 & 84.
50 The first amendment provides in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
51 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
52 Modem interpretation of the establishment clause stems from the Supreme Court's decision
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, the Court upheld a statute which authorized local school districts to reimburse parents for money spent sending their children to school by
public transportation. Taxpayers who challenged the statute argued that because parents of children attending parochial schools also benefitted, the state was supporting religion in violation of the
establishment clause of the first amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that such a general program which benefitted all students equally did not
violate the Constitution even though it helped children attend church-operated schools. The Court
stated that the first amendment "requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of reli-
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any governmental action must conform with both in order to be
constitutional.
1. Free Exercise Clause
When confronted with an alleged free exercise clause violation, the
Supreme Court weighs the interest of the individual in the free exercise
of his religion against the interest of the government in achieving valid
state goals. 53 When applying this balancing test, the Supreme Court first
considers whether the government's action actually interferes with the
practice of religion or the holding of a sincere religious belief.54 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in order for government regulation to amount to a free exercise violation, "it is necessary... for one
to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in
the practice of his religion." 5 5 If state action is found to burden religious
belief or practice, the Court requires that the action further a compelling
state interest which will justify the interference with religious beliefs and
practices. 5 6 The Court usually requires that any governmental interference be minimal, asking if the same objectives can be achieved in a less
57
burdensome manner.
Catholic doctrine, however, does not prohibit forming or bargaining
with a labor union. Therefore, the facts in Universidad Central can be distinguished from those found in free exercise cases such as Sherbert v. Verner,5 8 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 5 9 and Thomas v. Indiana Employment. 60 In those
opinions, the Supreme Court held that personal free exercise rights had
been abridged only after finding that the particular state regulation violated a specific religious belief.6 ' The Court does not consider legislation with a valid secular purpose to be violative of the free exercise clause
gious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary." Id. at 18. The
Court later noted in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970), that "[flor the men who wrote
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the establishment of religion connoted sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."
53 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
54 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. In Yoder, the parents of Amish students objected to a state statute
which made secondary school attendance compulsory. The parents claimed that by sending their
children to high school, they were violating basic tenets of their religion. The Supreme Court held
that the statute interfered with the free exercise of religion of both the children and the parents.
55 Abington Township School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963). See also Tony &
Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953, 1963 (1985) ("It is virtually self-evident
that the free exercise clause does not require an exemption from a governmental program unless, at
a minimum, inclusion in the program actually burdens the claimant's freedom to exercise religious
rights."); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968).
56 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
57 See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607.
58 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
59 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
60 450 U.S. 707 (1981). If an individual asserts that he cannot in good conscience follow a governmental regulation because of his religious beliefs, a court may be able to inquire into the individual's sincerity in asserting the claim. The courts, however, should not try to determine whether the
individual has properly interpreted the tenets of the faith which he or she asserts because "courts are
not arbitrators of scriptural interpretation." Id. at 716.
61 See supra note 54. In Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist refused to work on Saturdays because
her religious beliefs required rest on that day. In Thomas, the employee asserted that working in
production of war materials was against his religious beliefs.
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if it only imposes an indirect burden on one's religious beliefs and does
not amount to coercion or compulsion against the practice of those beliefs. 62 Rather, the Court chooses to examine such indirect conflicts
63
under the entanglement prong of establishment clause analysis.
2.

Establishment Clause

To ensure that a governmental action does not violate the establishment clause, the Supreme Court has generally used the three prong test
developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 64 Under the Lemon test, a statute does
not violate the establishment clause if it: (1) has a valid secular purpose;6 5 (2) has a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion; 6 6 and (3) does not foster excessive governmental entanglement
67
with religion.
a. Secular Purpose
The secular purpose prong of the Lemon test is probably the easiest
62 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607.
63 Many "nonlawyers" looking at the issue in UniversidadCentral and the words of the Constitution would argue that the free exercise clause, and not the establishment clause, should be dispositive. The Supreme Court, however, chooses to resolve many of these facially free exercise disputes
under the establishment clause because of its belief that the two clauses are often necessarily contradictory and a view that a "wall of separation" will resolve controversy to the satisfaction of both
clauses. For criticism of this idea, see Justice Stewart's dissent in Abington, 374 U.S. at 308. For
general criticism of the Court's treatment of the religion clauses, see Gaffney, Political Divisiveness
Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 205 (1980); Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement,
1971 Sup. CT. REV. 147; Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3 (1979); Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion
Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195 (1980). For two articles critical of the entanglement concept with contrary views as to NLRB jurisdiction over religious schools, see Laycock,
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981); Warner, NLRB Jurisdiction Over ParochialSchools: Catholic
Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 463 (1978).
64 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Supreme Court applied its three prong test to a Rhode
Island statute which authorized salary supplements to teachers in nonpublic schools and a Pennsylvania statute which authorized reimbursements to nonpublic schools for secular educational services including teachers' salaries. The Supreme Court, using the three part analysis, held both
statutes unconstitutional. The Court derived its three prong test from the basic premise behind its
decision in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947). See supra note 52. In Everson, the Court
held that the Constitution requires the government to remain neutral with respect to religion and
religious organizations. The Court recognized, however, that even when the government remains
essentially neutral, it might in some way affect.,religion. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17, 18. The Lemon test
developed as the Court tried to determine to what extent the government could affect religion
before a neutral act became an unconstitutional interference with, or advancement of, religion.
65 403 U.S. at 612. The Supreme Court examined the secular purpose of legislative actions as
early as Everson. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
66 403 U.S. at 612. Both secular purpose and primary effect were first expressly designated as
criteria to be used in analyzing the establishment clause in Abington Township School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). In Abington, the Court declared unconstitutional a state statute
which required students to hear readings from the Bible at the beginning of each school day. The
Court held that the primary effect of the statute was to advance religion in violation of the first
amendment.
67 403 U.S. at 613. The Supreme Court derived the excessive entanglement prong from Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In Wah, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that granted tax
exemptions to religious organizations for property used for religious purposes. The Court held that
elimination of the tax exemption would result in a high degree of state involvement because evaluation and confrontation by tax authorities would then be necessary.
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of the three prongs to satisfy. According to the Court, valid secular purposes include supporting higher education, 68 expanding educational op70
portunities, 6 9 advancing the moral and mental state of the community,
and improving the health, safety, recreation, and general well-being of
society. 7 1 When applying the secular purpose prong, the Court has generally looked at the intent of the legislature in enacting the legislation. If
the legislative action applies uniformly to all religious groups and appears neutral as to religious matters, the Court has usually held that it
72
has a valid secular purpose.
Consistent with this analysis, the NLRA, with its provision for NLRB
regulation of the relationship between employers and employees, unquestionably has a religiously neutral secular purpose: to equalize bargaining power between employees and employers through "protection
73
by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively"
with the hope of promoting "industrial peace."'74 The NLRA represents
Congress' attempt to resolve the national problems of industrial strife
created by the industrial revolution. 7 5 During that period, tension and
strife between labor and management threatened to impede the free flow
of commerce. Fulfilling its duty as guardian of the general well-being of
the public, Congress responded to the problem by enacting the NLRA.
b.

Primary Effect

The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that even a facially
neutral statute with a valid secular purpose may indirectly advance or
inhibit religion. 7 6 The second prong of the Lemon test determines
whether this advancement rises to such a level that its effect can no
longer be characterized as indirect. 7 7 Where state regulation is involved,
courts also use the primary effect prong to examine whether the government's actions so substantially inhibit a particular religion that the government is effectively supporting other religions. 78 If a governmental
68 Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 754 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741

(1973).
69 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678-79
(1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
70 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).

71 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1961).
72 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73.
73 See supra note 10. See also St. Elizabeth Community Hosp. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436, 1441 (9th
Cir. 1983) ("The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is clearly secular-to minimize industrial strife burdening interstate commerce by protecting employees' rights to organize and bargain
collectively.") (citation omitted).
74 See NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936). In upholding the constitutionality of the NLRA, the Court stated:
Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of employees to
self-organization and to have representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace. Refusal to confer and
negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife.
Id. at 42.
75 See generally C. MoRRIs, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 3-65 (2d ed. 1985).
76

See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.

77 See Abington Township School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
78 Most of the courts that have examined the primary effect of a challenged statute have looked
at whether the statute advances religion. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244 (1968);
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action has a primary effect that either advances or inhibits religion, it
79
violates the establishment clause.
When applying the primary effect prong, the Court has generally
taken a two-step approach. First, the Court examines the nature and intended direct effect of the statute.8 0 The Court usually infers this direct
effect from the text of the challenged statute. The effect can be expressed as the amount and kind of aid the statute provides, the type of
power it confers, or the kind of regulation it creates. 8 1 If the statute has a
direct secular effect, it satisfies the first part of the primary effect analysis.
The NLRA neither advances nor inhibits religion. As one court
resolving a similar issue stated: "The Act's primary effect is to require
collective bargaining and reduce labor disruptions, rather than to promote or deter acceptance of the Catholic faith." 8 2
Furthermore, on its face the Act applies uniformly to all religious
groups. Only two unquestionably secular requirements limit the extent
of the NLRB's jurisdiction: (1) the particular enterprise's activities must
affect commerce8 3 and (2) the enterprise must attain a certain minimum
level of gross annual revenues as set by the Board.8 4 Due to such neutral
regulation and noncontent-based selection criteria, the NLRA does not
85
threaten to advance or inhibit a religion.
Under the second step to the primary effect analysis, the Court examines whether the nature of an affected institution is so pervasively sectarian that even though a governmental action has a direct secular effect,
the action will inevitably advance or inhibit religion. The Court must
determine whether the secular aspects of the institution can be separated
from its sectarian attributes. If the institution is pervasively sectarian,
then even a governmental action with a facially secular purpose may promote or impede religion.8 6 Although Lemon dealt with aid to church-affilAbington Township School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The question of inhibition arises
more often in the free exercise context. See supra text accompanying notes 53-63.
79 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. See also Allen, 392 U.S. at 244.
80 For example, if the statute provides financial aid to a church-operated school, the Court examines the terms of the aid to ensure that it affects only the secular aspects of the school. See Tilton,
403 U.S. at 678-79.
81 See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 678-79. See also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26
(1982); Allen, 392 U.S. at 244; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
82 St. Elizabeth Community Hosp. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436, 1441 (9th Cir. 1983).
83 Section 10(a) of the NLRA authorizes the Board "to prevent any person from engaging in any
unfair labor practice.., affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). See also NLRB v.Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (Court held that the Act gives the NLRB jurisdiction to the
fullest extent permitted by the commerce clause.). Accord NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S.
224 (1963).
84 The NLRB has not chosen to extend its authority to the constitutional limit allowed under the
commerce clause and instead has set discretionary jurisdictional standards expressed as a minimum
level of gross annual revenues. For example, "[tihe Board will assert its jurisdiction in any proceeding arising under sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Act involving any private nonprofit college or university
which has a gross annual revenue from all sources ... of not less than $I million." 29 C.F.R. § 103.1
(1985).
85 An exemption from NLRB jurisdiction could be construed as advancing the interests of the
exempted religion. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (The Court invalidated a tax benefit for parents incurring expenses relating to the education
of a child in a nonpublic school. The Court found that the primary effect of such legislation is to aid
one religious group in preference to others.).
86 See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975).
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iated schools, the distinctions which the Court has drawn between
colleges and universities on the one hand, and primary and secondary
schools on the other, prove useful for resolving state regulation cases as
well.
In the area of aid to church-operated elementary or secondary
schools, the Court frequently has found that a statute, although facially
neutral, still may have a primary effect that advances or inhibits religion.8 7 In such cases, the Court has usually determined that the churchaffiliated elementary or secondary school has a "substantial religious mission." 8 8 Therefore, almost any governmental aid to such a school violates the establishment clause. Employing this reasoning, the Court has
declared unconstitutional statutes authorizing loans of instructional material to such schools, 9 reimbursing expenses incurred in the examination and testing of their students, 90 granting funds for maintenance and
repair of such schools' facilities, 9 ' and subsidizing teachers in such
92
institutions.
In contrast, similar aid has been upheld when the benefitting institution is a church-affiliated university or college and when such aid has a
statutorily stipulated secular purpose and effect. 9 3 The Court has determined that religiously affiliated institutions of higher learning are not so
pervasively religious that their sectarian qualities cannot be distinguished
from their secular activities. 9 4
c. Excessive Entanglement
Inquiry into the nature of the institution affected by certain governmental actions is also necessary when applying the third prong of the
Lemon test. In analyzing whether a statute creates excessive governmental entanglement with religion, courts examine "the character and purpose of the institution affected, the nature of the activity engaged in or
mandated by the government, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious organization." 9 5 Where the church-gov87
88

See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 613 (1971).
In Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616, the Supreme Court stated:
The various characteristics of the schools make them a powerful vehicle for transmitting the
Catholic faith to the next generation. This process of inculcating religious doctrine is, of
course, enhanced by the impressionable age of pupils in primary schools particularly. In
short, parochial schools involve substantial religious activity and purpose.
89 E.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
90 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
91 Id.
92 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
93 See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (Court upheld state grants to
private religious colleges where the grant stipulated that the funds could not be used for sectarian
purposes); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (Court upheld a statute that permitted the issuance
of revenue bonds to help finance construction of a religious college's facilities if the facilities were to
be used exclusively for secular activities); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (Court upheld a
state statute that provided construction grants to colleges and universities for buildings and facilities
to be used exclusively for secular educational purposes).
94 See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687.
95 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971). Aside from considerations of the specific relationship that fosters excessive government entanglement with religion, the Court, when applying the
Lemon test, also looks at a more general societal effect which it terms "divisive political potential."
Id. at 622. The Court defines political divisiveness as the division of political forces along religious
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ernment relationship that results involves excessive interaction or has the
held that the governpotential for excessive entanglement, the Court has
96
mental action violated the establishment clause.
In cases of state aid to religiously affiliated institutions, the Court
has found that when the institution is so pervasively religious that its secular activities cannot easily be separated from its sectarian actions, increased governmental monitoring may be necessary to ensure that the
government affects only secular activities so as not to violate the establishment clause. 9 7 Similarly, if the governmental action broadly applies
throughout a religious institution, continuous surveillance may be necessary to ensure that the action applies only to the institution's secular
functions. Whether such monitoring is necessary and, if so, how much
monitoring will be required depends not only on the character of the
institution, but also on the nature of the governmental action. 98 Thus, in
Universidad Central, the character and purpose of the university and the
nature of NLRB intrusion will determine whether entanglement is
excessive.
Excessive Entanglement Analysis Applied to Universidad Central
A. Characterand Purpose
An examination of the character and purpose of Universidad Central
de Bayamon must consider the essential differences between religiously
affiliated universities and parochial schools in the degree of religious permeation. The Court based its previous recognition of this distinction in
Tilton v. Richardson on its findings that college students are less susceptible to religious indoctrination than younger students, that by their naIV.

lines that might result were government to become excessively entangled in the affairs of a religious
organization. The Court has been particularly wary of the potential for political divisiveness in cases
in which statutes provide for direct financial subsidies, as well as cases in which the statute allows the
religious organization to become involved in the governmental process. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 370 (1975). See also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (Court held
unconstitutional a state statute which provided that premises located within a 500-foot radius of a
church or school would not be licensed for the sale of alcoholic beverages if the governing body of
such church or school filed a written objection.).
96 The Court has refused to find excessive entanglement, however, when the statute is such that
very little monitoring would be necessary or when the institution is such that the secular can easily be
separated from the sectarian. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983) (Court upheld a
state statute allowing parents to deduct the cost of their children's tuition, textbooks, and
transportation.).
97 The Court found in Lemon that continuous surveillance of state-subsidized teachers would be
necessary to ensure that they did not teach religious principles in their secular courses. According to
the Court, this surveillance would constitute excessive governmental entanglement with religion.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. See also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (Court held that a
statute providing instructional material and nonideological auxiliary services violated the establishment clause because of the need for continuous surveillance.).
98 While the Court has repeatedly used the Lemon test in establishment clause analysis, it is important to note that the Court does not intend for it to be applied with scientific precision. The
Court has stated that the Lemon principles should be "no more than helpful signposts." Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973). Lemon analysis serves as a guide to upholding the spirit and intent
of the establishment clause. In any analysis, the primary focus is on the establishment clause itself
and the protections it embodies. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358-59 (1975) ("It is well to
emphasize, however, that the tests must not be viewed as setting the precise limits to the necessary
constitutional inquiry, but serve only as guidelines with which to identify instances in which the
objectives of the Establishment Clause have been impaired.").
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ture college and post-graduate courses limit opportunities for sectarian
influence, and that a high degree of academic freedom often exists at
church-affiliated colleges and universities. 9 9
Those distinctions found in Tilton turn upon the differences between
the roles teachers play in a religiously affiliated university and teachers'
roles in religiously affiliated primary and secondary schools.10 0 The nature of the faculty and its responsibilities indicate the extent of sectarianism in a school and the resulting entanglement that unionization might
engender.101

Under Universidad Central's by-laws, a candidate for faculty admission must "possess the appropriate academic degrees, be of a sound
moral character and show traits of pedagogical qualities." 10 2 As Judge
Coffin pointed out, such requirements "are no different from those at
most universities across the country" 10° 3 regardless of religious affiliation.
The teachers are not expected to provide their students with "the intense
inculcative religious experience" that is the norm at parochial schools.' 0 4
99 Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686. The Court also noted that in contrast to the complete control over the
educational process sought by the administrators of parochial schools, "many church-related colleges and universities are characterized by a high degree of academic freedom and seek to evoke free
and critical responses from their students." Id. at 686.
100 Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 404. The Board itself has recognized the vital distinctions
between teachers at parochial schools and teachers at universities in upholding its jurisdiction over
professors in a church-related college. See Barber-Scotia College, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 406 (1979). But
see Trustee of St. Joseph's College, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1986) (Board denied jurisdiction asserted by
regional director.). In St. Joseph's the Board stated:
We cannot conclude based on generalizations about the difference between secondary and
postsecondary education that Board jurisdiction over a postsecondary school can never
pose the risk to first amendment freedom foreseen by the Court in Catholic Bishop. Rather,
we find that we can more properly accommodate first amendment concerns by considering
the application of Catholic Bishop to all educational institutions on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, to the extent that Barber-Scotia and similar cases stand for the proposition that
Catholic Bishop does not apply to colleges and universities, they are overruled.
See also infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
101 The NLRB has asserted jurisdiction over religious faculty members, as well as lay members,
when the religious teachers were not affiliated in any manner with their employer except in their
capacity as faculty members signing a standard employment contract. D'Youville College, 225
N.L.R.B. 792 (1976). But see Seton Hill College, 201 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1027 (1973) (Faculty nuns were
excluded from a bargaining unit because they were members of the religious order that owned and
administered the college and thus were "in a sense part of the employer" with ties of allegiance and
obedience to the order that might place them, as members of a bargaining unit, in a position of
conflicting loyalties.).
102 UniversidadCentral, 793 F.2d at 405.
103 Id. The faculty members' functions are also similar to those of faculties at colleges or universities in general: "[T]eaching classes, giving and grading examinations, handing in grades on time,
orienting students, participating actively in the university life, doing research work and seeking his
professional development, and any others assigned by the academic Dean." Id.
104 Id. See also Cuesnongle v. Ramos, 713 F.2d 881 (Ist Cir. 1983). Universidad Central was
found to be less pervasively religious than a parochial school, thus allowing the Department of Consumer Affairs to assert jurisdiction over the university to complain of breach of contract by students.
The court noted:
This is different from a true parochial school which not only is run directly by the church,
but has attributes such as integration of secular and religious instruction, mandatory religious instruction, religion based admissions policies, has as a central purpose the inculcation of religious values ... with other similar features .... [Universidad Central], however,
is a true liberal arts university .... [and] [h]owever much some of its high officers and a
small percentage of its teachers are priests devoted to the principles and concepts of the
Catholic Church, [Universidad Central] is not primarily carrying on a religious activity in
the First Amendment sense.
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Because religious indoctrination is not the central purpose or activity of
Universidad Central or of its teachers, the risk that NLRB jurisdiction
will result in excessive entanglement is substantially reduced. Because of
the secular nature of the faculty,1 0 5 employment controversies will seldom involve religious issues. Consequently, there is a diminished need
for government surveillance of the NLRB's relationship with the
school1 0 6 and a lessened likelihood that entanglement issues will arise.
In fact, the NLRB found no excessive entanglement in asserting jurisdiction over the faculty of a religious college when no evidence indicated "that religious doctrine affect[ed] the teaching of courses offered
for credit towards a degree." 10 7 Under this circumstance, the NLRB was
"not confronted with the serious first amendment difficulties envisioned
by the Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop" and properly rejected the arguan impermissible
ment that its assertion of jurisdiction would 0 constitute
8
entanglement of government with religion.'
B.

The Nature of NLRB Intrusion

When examining the second excessive entanglement inquiry, the nature of the NLRB's intrusion, courts should note that the NLRB has statutory authority to perform only two functions: "[T]he prevention and
remedying of unfair labor practices and the determination of questions
concerning employee representation." 1 0 9 If a court finds that NLRB jurisdiction results in excessive entanglement of the government with religion, the court must have concluded that the exercise of at least one of
these two NLRB functions would have led to a first amendment violation.
Governmental entanglement in the affairs of religious institutions is
inevitable; to be unconstitutional, the entanglement must be excessive.1 1 0 Certification of a union, however, presents no excessive entanglement problem. In the certification process, the university becomes
involved only after the NLRB determines that it meets the religiously
neutral interstate commerce standards set for jurisdiction-involvement
in interstate commerce with "gross annual revenue from all sources...
exceed[ing] $1 million."'' Although such an inquiry may require the
university to open its books, this minimal intrusion does not violate the
letter or spirit of either religion clause.
Id. at 883.
105 Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 405.
106 See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687.
107 Barber-Scotia College, 245 N.L.R.B. 406, 407 (1979). Barber-Scotia and Universidad Central
are similar in several respects. First, each school's primary mission is to provide a secular education.
Barber-Scotia, 245 N.L.R.B. at 406; UniversidadCentral, 793 F.2d at 386, 400. Second, the schools do
not stress the teaching of religious principles in their curriculums. Barber-Scotia, 245 N.L.R.B. at 407;
UniversidadCentral, 793 F.2d at 405. Third, in teaching theology and philosophy courses the teachers
are not required to pursue a specified religious course, but rather cover a variety of religions and
ways of thinking. Barber-Scotia, 245 N.L.R.B. at 407; Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 386. Finally,
while religious services are offered on both campuses, attendance by the students is not mandatory.
Barber-Scotia, 245 N.L.R.B. at 407; UniversidadCentral, 793 F.2d at 386.
108 Barber-Scotia, 245 N.L.R.B. at 407.
109 L. MODJESKA, NLRB PRACTICE 7 (1983).
110 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
111 See supra note 84.
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Additionally, the election of a union at Universidad Central involves
only the faculty members 1 2 who the court found to be nonmanagerial
employees, and therefore not exempt under NLRB v. Yeshiva University.113 Thus, the election process and certification activity will be iso14
lated from the religious management of the school.'
Judge Breyer also saw the potential for an entangling Board inquiry
if the NLRB were to investigate an unfair labor practice charge. 15 But
Board inquiry begins only after the filing of an unfair labor practice
charge,'1 6 after which the Board may conduct an investigation., 17 "This
activity on the part of the Board is quite different from the continuous
auditing surveillance feared by the Supreme Court in Lemon"' 18 and seen
by the Court as a prime example of excessive entanglement.i 19 Instead
of continuous surveillance, NLRB jurisdiction will produce only incidental intrusion by requiring examination of Universidad Central's actions
"only with respect to specific charges which may be filed in the limited
area of collective bargaining and labor relations."' 120
A more complicated situation may arise if a faculty member is dismissed allegedly under a Universidad Central regulation providing that a
professor may be terminated for "offenses to the Christian morality."' 12
If the fired teacher asserts that the dismissal was actually due to an unfair
labor practice, Judge Breyer believed that the NLRB, which has exclusive
jurisdiction over unfair labor practice charges, would impermissibly en22
mesh itself in church doctrinal matters.'
It is well settled, however, that courts defer to religious authorities
on matters of religious doctrine.' 23 Religious authorities have the power
"to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine."' 124 But in various
ways the government has asserted limited jurisdiction over religiously affiliated schools without violating the first amendment. For example, a
112 Beyond providing a list of employees eligible to vote, a university is not required to participate in the union election process. See generally L. MODJESKA, NLRB PRACTICE 228-50 (1983).
113 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
114 Since the faculty is not managerial in nature, it is removed from the places of power in the

university and therefore is in greater need of labor law protection.
115

Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 401-02.

116 Id. at 388 (citing Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 53 (1954)).
117 Id. (citing NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 308 (1959)).
118 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 ("A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these [government] restrictions are obeyed and the
First Amendment otherwise respected.").
119 See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
120 St. Elizabeth Community Hosp. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1983).
121 UniversidadCentral, 793 F.2d at 405.
122 Id. at 401.
123 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). See also Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440 (1969); U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); Reardon v. Lemoyne, 122 N.H. 1042, 1047, 454
A.2d 428, 432 (1982) ("In religious controversies involving property or contractual rights outside

the doctrinal realm, a court may accept jurisdiction and render a decision without violating the first
amendment.").
124 Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). See also Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696;
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (In criminal prosecution for mail fraud, the district
court ruled properly when it withheld from the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of
the religious beliefs or doctrines of the respondents.).
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state civil rights commission "violates no constitutional rights by merely
investigating the circumstances of [a discharge], if only to ascertain
whether the ascribed religious reason was in fact the reason for the discharge."' 125 Similarly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
may not continue to investigate a faculty discharge once the religious
institution "presents convincing evidence that [a] challenged employment practice resulted from discrimination on the basis of religion
...
,"126 The investigation allowed under such jurisdiction does not proceed beyond an acceptable minimal burden on the religious aspects of
27
the school.'
A similar situation would arise if the NLRB adjudicated a faculty dismissal dispute at Universidad Central. The NLRA only makes it unlawful
to discharge an employee for reasons related to the employee's union or
protected concerted activities.' 28 If a discharge for an alleged religious
reason occurs, the university satisfies its burden of proof by showing that
30
sincerely held 129 religious beliefs or practices motivated the dismissal.'
If the school meets the burden, the Board investigates no further, keeping the intrusion into the realm of religion at an acceptable minimum
level. In any case, the Board would never inquire into the doctrinal correctness of beliefs. In such a manner, the church-government relationship resulting from NLRB jurisdiction over the university's faculty would
not violate the excessive entanglement prong of the establishment
clause.
Finally, the NLRB decides which "other conditions of employment"
become mandatory subjects of bargaining. Judge Breyer argued that requiring the university to accept a union meant that the Board would determine the issues over which the university would be required to
negotiate-inevitably including matters of religion in violation of the establishment clause.' 3 ' However, permitting bargaining by the faculty at
125 Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2724 (1986).
126 EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912
(1981). Section 702 of Title VII exempts from the application of Title VII religious educational
institutions "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with carrying on by such . . . educational institution . . . of its activities."

42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-1 (1982).
127 Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 488.
128 See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). See also NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S.
393, 394 (1983).
129 The Supreme Court does not find that civil adjudication violates the first amendment when
the investigation involves a person's sincerity in asserting that his religious beliefs required an exemption. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 859-63 (1978).
130 See TransportationManagement Corp., 462 U.S. at 401-02 (In an unfair labor practice proceeding
by the Board, burden of proof is on the employer to prove that absent improper motivation the

employer would have acted in the same manner.). See also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977) (Plaintiff had burden of proving that employer's disapproval of his first amendment protected expression caused employer to discharge him. The burden then shifts to defendant

employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same dismissal
decision even if not motivated by a desire to punish plaintiff for his speech.); Catholic High School
Ass'n. of Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1168-69 (2d Cir. 1985) (The court determined that the Board may not inquire into whether a religiously based reason given for a discharge

is truly part of church dogma. Rather, the Board may only determine whether the reason is part of a
"dual motive" for the discharge.).
131 Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 402.
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a religiously affiliated university with a primarily secular purpose is similar to allowing it at religiously affiliated hospitals and service organizations. Courts of appeals uniformly have held that NLRB jurisdiction
does not pose significant entanglement problems at these institutions for
precisely the same reason that jurisdiction should not in most religiously
affiliated universities: These types of institutions "do not pose the risk of
entanglement that exists in precollege schools where teachers play such
an all-encompassing role."' 3 2 Rather, like Universidad Central, religiously affiliated hospitals have a secular primary purpose. For hospitals
that purpose is the same as that of any secular hospital-providing medical care for the sick.13 3 Similarly, Universidad Central's primary purpose
is the same as at any secular university-providing "a humanistic education at an academic level."' 3 4 Because the teachers have little to do with
religion, most aspects of employment over which the faculty and the university would negotiate would have nothing to do with religion.
If the university felt that a subject of bargaining entered the religious
realm in violation of the first amendment, the university could still assert
its rights by refusing to bargain in order to seek judicial review where
precedent mandates deference to all religious beliefs and practices asserted in good faith.
V.

Conclusion

When analyzing the issue of NLRB jurisdiction over religiously affiliated universities, courts must recognize the essential differences in religious orientation between teachers in parochial schools and faculty
members of post-secondary schools. Such distinctions help determine
whether NLRB intrusion into the labor affairs of the university will violate the first amendment religion clauses. Because the Supreme Court's
holding in CatholicBishop should generally be limited to teachers in religiously permeated elementary and secondary schools, it does not control
the issue of NLRB jurisdiction over the faculty of church-affiliated colleges and universities. Courts facing postsecondary unionization issues
must go beyond a simple application of the Catholic Bishop holding and
delve into substantive constitutional analysis to determine whether
NLRB jurisdiction threatens to violate the religion clauses of the first
amendment. This analysis will involve an examination of the character
and purpose of the affected institution, the intrusion into the religious
realm that will result from NLRB investigations and rulings, and the religious or secular nature of the disputes that the NLRB might encounter.
The First Circuit's decision in Universidad Central was the result of
confusion regarding the applicability of Catholic Bishop. The court should
have refused to extend Catholic Bishop beyond its facts and instead should
have applied traditional religion clause analysis. Under such analysis,
132 Id. at 406.
133 See, e.g., St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 1193, 1196 (7th Cir. 1983); St. Elizabeth
Community Hosp. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436, 1441 (9th Cir. 1983).
134 Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 386, 405.
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NLRB jurisdiction over the lay faculty at Universidad Central de
Bayamon would be appropriate.
Anne Marie Cook
William R. Cowden
Eric P. Heichel
Elizabeth M. Saunders

ANTITRUST

LAW-WESTMAN COMMISSION CO. v. HOBART INTERNATIONA4
INC.: REFUSAL TO FIND PER SE ILLEGAL A MANUFACTURER'S TERMINATION
OF A DISTRIBUTOR AT THE BEHEST OF A COMPETING DISTRIBUTOR-A
TREND TOWARD ABOLISHMENT OF THE PER SE RULE IN ALL VERTICAL
RESTRAINTS?

Federal courts have traditionally applied a rule of reason analysis to
vertical antitrust claims not involving price-fixing. Where the alleged antitrust violation stems from a manufacturer's termination of a distributor
at the request of a competing distributor, however, courts disagree on
the applicable standard. In this situation, some courts have varied from
the traditional application of the rule of reason and have adopted a per
se illegality analysis. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit addressed this dilemma in Westman Commission Co. v. Hobart International, Inc. I In Westman, the Tenth Circuit applied the rule of reason
analysis to a manufacturer's refusal to grant a distributorship at the behest of another distributor. In upholding the manufacturer's action
under section one of the Sherman Act, 2 the court criticized a Third Circuit decision that would have applied the per se rule.8
In applying the rule of reason, however, the court relied heavily on
the economic theories ofjudges and scholars who advocate the abolition
of the per se rule in all vertical restraint cases. The court also adhered to
the rationale of a Supreme Court decision which has been questioned.
This analysis illustrates the present confusion in this area of antitrust law.
Circuit courts have espoused conflicting opinions concerning the propriety of distributor terminations. In accordance with their perspective,
courts will characterize facts and use precedent in confusing and conflicting fashions in order to effectuate the "desired" outcome. This leaves
business executives without reliable legal guidance in making important
business decisions. The cost of mistakes (treble damages) in this area is
too great for uncertainty to continue.
Part I of this comment traces the relevant judicial development of
vertical restraint analysis. Next, Part II sets forth the facts and holding of
Westman in light of this history. Part III suggests that application of the
1 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986).
2 The statute reads: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
3 The Westman court criticized the Third Circuit's decision in Cemuto Inc. v. United Cabinet
Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979). See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
In antitrust analysis, courts consider three factors: (1) whether there is a "conspiracy"; (2)
whether price fixing is involved; and (3) whether the restraint imposed is vertical or horizontal. A
horizontal restraint results when competitors at the same level of the market structure form a combination in restraint of trade. When persons at different levels of the market structure act in concert,
as in the case of a manufacturer conspiring with a distributor, the restraint is vertical in nature.
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1971).
The court in Mestman was concerned with the last two factors. Once the court found that a
nonprice vertical restraint existed, it then had to determine whether to apply the rule of reason or
the per se rule. The per se rule had traditionally been applied only to horizontal restraints and
vertical restraints involving price fixing and tying arrangements.
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rule of reason will lead to correct adjudication of this type of restraint
and posits that Westman may indicate a trend toward the abolishment of
the per se rule in all vertical restraint cases.
I.

An Analysis of Vertical Restraints

An analysis of vertical restraints in antitrust law begins with the concept that certain business relationships are per se illegal. 4 In Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 5 the Supreme Court noted that the per
se rule is applicable to price-fixing, 6 division of markets, 7 group boycotts, 8 and tying arrangements. 9 Section one of the Sherman Act specifi-

cally prohibits such concerted action designed to achieve a monopoly.
Absent a combination or conspiracy, however, manufacturers may limit
their dealings without violating this provision.' 0 Thus, the Act acknowledges a party's right to unilaterally refuse to deal."
Typically, courts scrutinize restraints of trade which do not fall into
one of the specifically prohibited categories under the rule of reason.
Under this standard, courts consider the competitive effect of the restraint. A manufacturer violates section one if the restraint imposed hinders or destroys competition. Conversely, if the restraint regulates or
enhances competition, the manufacturer is not liable under section
4 The Supreme Court explained the per se doctrine in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiries as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use."
5 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
6 Id. at 5 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210 (1940)). In attempting to define what is considered price-fixing under the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has
noted: "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing commerce is illegal per se." 310 U.S. at 223.
7 356 U.S. at 5 (citing United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899)). Division of markets is defined as "an agreement between competitors at the same level of the market
structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition." Topco, 405 U.S. at 608.
8 356 U.S. at 5 (citing Fashion Originators Guild of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S.
457, 668 (1941)). Group boycotts are defined as "concerted refusals by traders to deal with other
traders." Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
9 356 U.S. at 5 (citing International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)). A tying
arrangement is defined as "an agreement by a party to sell one product (the tying article) but only on
the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product." Id.
10 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). In Colgate, the Court noted that: "In the
absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." Id. at 307.
11 The Supreme Court has diminished the effect of this right by broadly interpreting what constitutes a combination or conspiracy under § 1. In United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960), the Court found that a manufacturer violated the Sherman Act by refusing to deal with a
wholesaler unless the wholesaler withheld sales of the manufacturer's product from retailers. Specifically, the Court held that:
When the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond mere announcement of his policy and
the simple refusal to deal, and he employs other means which effect adherence to his resale
prices, ... he has put together a combination in violation of the Sherman Act. Thus,
whether an unlawful combination or conspiracy is proved, is to be judged by what the parties actually did rather than by the words they used.
Id. at 44.
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one. 12
Aside from the generally accepted view that price-fixing arrangements are illegal per se, courts have enunciated few other guidelines
which test vertical restraints allegedly violating the Sherman Act. Specifically, the line of demarcation between the application of the per se rule
or the rule of reason has become increasingly cluttered. The Supreme
Court exhibited this judicial uncertainty in United States v. Arnold Schwinn
Co. 13 In Schwinn, the Court, without considering whether the form of the
transaction significantly affected intrabrand or interbrand competition (a
critical consideration in any vertical restraint analysis), 14 evaluated the
manufacturer's (Schwinn's) two distribution systems by different standards. In Schwinn's first system, the distributor acted as wholesaler, buying and reselling bicycles. Title and risk of loss passed fully to the
distributor. The Court found that nonprice restrictions in this system
were per se illegal. In Schwinn's second system, the distributor obtained
its inventory through a consignment plan with Schwinn. The distributor
then sold directly to a retailer. Here, however, the Court analyzed the
contested restraints under a rule of reason. 15 In differentiating the distribution systems, the Court focused on the status of tite and the risk of
loss. The Court found that once a manufacturer relinquished title, it had
no right to restrict the sale of the product. In striking down the restraints
associated with the first distribution system, the Schwinn Court found a
per se illegality for a nonprice vertical restriction. 16
The Supreme Court reconsidered the Schwinn decision in Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 17 In Sylvania, the court overruled Schwinn's
per se illegality holding, signaling a change in its economic analysis. The
Sylvania Court held that vertical restraints have economic utility, and, as
such, should not be subjected to a rule of per se illegality.1 8 However,
the Court left open "the possibility that particular applications of vertical
12 Justice Brandeis classically stated the rule of reason approach in Board of Trade of Chicago v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be obtained, are all relevant factors.
13 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
14 In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Supreme Court delineated the difference between interbrand and intrabrand competition:
Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the same generic
product and is the primary concern of antitrust law. The extreme example of a deficiency of
interbrand competition is monopoly, where there is only one manufacturer. In contrast,
intrabrand competition is the competition between the distributors-wholesale or retail-of
the product of a particular manufacturer.
Id. at 52 n.19.
15 388 U.S. at 379-80.
16 In dicta, the Court emphasized that, absent price-fixing, the manufacturer has broad discretion in creating his distribution system. 388 U.S. at 376.
17 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
18 Id. at 38.
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restrictions might justify per se prohibition."1 9

Following Sylvania, it appeared that the per se rule would only apply
20
to vertical restraints occurring in price-fixing types of arrangements.
The Seventh Circuit adopted this interpretation in Products Liability Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Crum & ForsterInsurance Cos.

2

1

In Products Liability, the

distributor claimed that a supplier terminated its distribution agreement
at the request of another distributor. 22 The court stated that:
[I]n the absence of any evidence of intent to raise prices.., an agreement whereby a supplier of some good or service refuses, at the behest
of one of his distributors, to deal with a competitor of that distributor
is not illegal per se. To prevail in such a case the plaintiff
must show
23
that the refusal to deal is likely to reduce competition.

This approach to a nonprice vertical restraint parallels the Sylvania
Court's finding that the anticompetitive effects of a vertical restraint "can
be adequately policed under the rule of reason, the standard traditionally
applied for the majority of anticompetitive practices challenged under
24
§ 1 of the Act."
The Third Circuit, however, established a different approach to
dealer termination controversies in Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp.2 5
The court in Cernuto appeared to adopt a view that a supplier, who terminates a distributor because of another distributor's complaints, changes
the vertical restraint into a restraint "primarily horizontal in nature in
that one customer is seeking to suppress its competition by utilizing the
power of a common supplier. 26 Therefore, although the termination in such a situation is, itself, a vertical restraint, the desired impact
27
is horizontal and on the dealer, not the manufacturer, level."
The court's recharacterization of a vertical restraint as a horizontal
restraint appears to add a new category of restraints to antitrust lawthose which are actually vertical but apparently horizontal in nature. Ap19 Id. at 59. This caveat has been the source of much of the confusion surrounding the applicability of the per se rule with vertical restraints.
20 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
21 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1980).
22 Products Liability involved an insurance broker who claimed an insurance agency and another
insurance broker had conspired to exclude him from the insurance business in violation of the Sherman Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, Judge Posner
held that the plaintiff had failed to show a conspiracy; and, even if such a conspiracy existed, the
plaintiff had not shown any harm to competition. Therefore, the defendants had not violated the
Act. Id.
23 682 F.2d at 663.
24 433 U.S. at 59.
25 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979). Cernuto involved a kitchen cabinet manufacturer who allegedly
terminated a discounting distributor after complaints by another distributor. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants, but the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the
case for trial on the belief that a per se violation might be found. Id.
26 The opinion in Cernuto contains ambiguous passages and some other circuits have interpreted
the case to require that proof of a price-fixing arrangement be present in order to find a per se
violation. See, e.g., Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l., Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983);
Products Liability, 682 F.2d 660; Alloy Intern. Co. v. Hoover-NSK Beaming Co., 635 F.2d 1222 (7th
Cir. 1980). However, the Third Circuit's subsequent opinion in Tunis Bros., infra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text, appears to indicate that a vertical restraint will be judged by the per se rule if its
"true" effect is horizontal.
27 595 F.2d at 168.
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plying the per se rule to this type of restraint makes distributor terminations in the Third Circuit a risky venture. If a distributor's termination is
not completely unilateral, the "application of a per se rule may be warranted, ' 28 and a manufacturer might be liable for a treble damage
judgment.
The Supreme Court completely ignored this "new" restraint category in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.2 9 In Monsanto, the Court
detailed two preliminary distinctions which are critical in adjudicating
dealer termination cases. First, the Court distinguished concerted actions from independent actions, emphasizing that "unilateral action is
not proscribed." 30 Secondly, the Court distinguished concerted action
to set prices, "[which has] been per se illegal since the early years of
national antitrust enforcement," 3' from concerted action on nonprice restrictions, "[which] are judged under the rule of reason." 3 2 Thus, the
court recognized that concerted action on a vertical restraint must include a price element before the court will apply the per se rule.
This analysis appears to undermine the Cernuto contention 3 3 that a
refusal to deal, prompted by dealer complaints, 34 could subject a manufacturer to judgment under the per se rule 35-even absent price fixing.
Indeed, the Court in Monsanto stated that "[niothing in our decision today undercuts the holding of Sylvania that nonprice restrictions are to be
36
judged under the rule of reason."
Despite this guidance from the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit
continues to refer to a "hybrid configuration" that exists in dealer termination cases involving competitor complaints. 3 7 The Third Circuit emphasizes that the horizontal impact of vertical restraints extends the per
se rule's application to nonprice cases. This analysis directly opposes the
position adopted by the Supreme Court3 8 and the Tenth Circuit.
II. Westman Commission Co. v. Hobart International,Inc.
Westman 3 9 involved three independent businesses: Hobart Interna28 Id. Thus, Cernuto seized upon the possibility of the application of the per se rule to vertical
restraints left open in Sylvania. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
29 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984) rev'" 684 F.2d 1226 (1982). Monsanto dealt with the burden of proof
required for a plaintiff to survive a motion for a directed verdict. The case, however, contains dicta
which clarifies the applicability of the per se rule in cases involving dealer terminations which result
from an agreement between a manufacturer and another distributor.
30 104 S. Ct. at 1469.
31 Id.
32 Id.

33 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
34 It should be emphasized that these complaints must create an agreement between the manufacturer and distributor in order to create the concerted action required for a violation of § I of the
Sherman Act. For a discussion of what constitutes an agreement, see Monsanto, 104 S.Ct. at 1471.
35 Cernuto, 595 F.2d at 168.
36 104 S.Ct. at 1468 n.6.
37 Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1498 (3d Cir. 1985) rev'g in part 587 F.
Supp. 267 (E.D. Pa. 1984), vacated, 106 S.Ct. 1509 (1986).
38 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded Tunis Bros. The Court, however, based its rationale on the evidentiary burden of production necessary to avoid summaryjudgment instead of relying
on the per se issues. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S.Ct. 1348
(1986). See also supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
39 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986).
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tional, Inc. (Hobart), a major manufacturer of commercial kitchen equipment; Westman Commission Co. (Westman), a Denver-area distributor
of commercial kitchen equipment; and, Nobel, Inc. (Nobel), another distributor located in the Denver area. In 1978, Hobart sold its products to
approximately 540 of approximately 1,600 independent restaurant
40 As of January, 1976,'4 1
equipment distributors in the United States.
Hobart supplied goods to eight distributors in the highly competitive
Denver-area market. 42 Of these distributors, Nobel accounted for forty
43
to fifty percent of Hobart's sales in this market between 1973 and 1977.
In 1973, Westman entered the market by purchasing the assets of a
restaurant equipment supply division. 44 This division had previously
participated in an informal arrangement with Hobart to distribute its
products. The relationship continued for approximately fourteen
months after Westman's purchase. 45 During this time, Hobart never offered Westman a formal distributorship. In July, 1974, and again in January, 1976, Hobart notified Westman that it would not grant Westman a
distributorship. 46 Additionally, Hobart informed Westman that it would
no longer sell equipment to Westman on a casual basis.
47
Westman sued Hobart under section one of the Sherman Act
claiming that Hobart and Nobel had conspired to prevent Westman from
competing in the Denver-area market. 4 8 Westman did not allege either a
tying arrangement 4 9 or price-fixing. 50 Rather, Westman merely maintained that Nobel, seeking to avoid competition from Westman, convinced Hobart to terminate its relationship with Westman. 5 a
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held
that Hobart committed a per se violation of section one of the Sherman
Act. 5 2 The court stated that "a conspiracy to exclude a competitor from
the trade is, in and of itself, the substance which the Sherman Act is intended to prohibit." 5 3 The court further declared that, even under a rule
of reason analysis, 54 Hobart's action constituted a section one violation.5 5 After hearing testimony that Hobart's products were not matched
with equivalent goods from competitors in the market, the court concluded that trade was restrained and competition was impoverished if a
40 Id. at 1219.
41 InJanuary, 1976, Hobart reaffirmed that it would not sell equipment to Westman on a casual
basis. Id.
42 796 F.2d at 1219.
43 Id.
44 Westman purchased the WE-4 Division of Wilscam Enterprises, Inc. Prior to 1973, Westman
sold only grocery items on a commercial level. Id.
45 796 F.2d at 1219.
46 Id.
47 See supra note 2.
48 796 F.2d at 1219.
49 See supra note 9.
50 See supra note 6.
51 796 F.2d at 1219.
52 Id. See Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Corp., 461 F. Supp. 627, 636 (D. Colo. 1978). See
also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
53 461 F. Supp. at 636.
54 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
55 461 F. Supp. at 636.
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dealer did not have access to Hobart goods at a comparable price.5 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed
the trial court's decision. Noting that "the purpose of the antitrust laws
is the promotion of consumer welfare,"' 57 the court analyzed the restraint
based on "its effect on consumers, not on competitors."5 Thus, the Tenth
Circuit felt compelled to look beyond Nobel's anticompetitive motive,
which triggered the restraint.
Recognizing that the "applicability of the per se test [was] in a state
of evolution," 5 9 the majority held that Hobart's termination of Westman
was not per se illegal. Rather, the court, following the rationale of the
Seventh Circuit, stated that "in the absence of any evidence of intent to
raise prices ... an agreement whereby a supplier of some good or service
refuses, at the behest of one of his distributors, to deal with a competitor
of that distributor is not illegal per se." 60 The Tenth Circuit thus rejected the view adopted in other circuit courts 6 1 that a manufacturer's
refusal to deal with a distributor is a per se antitrust violation if that refusal is made at the behest of a competing distributor.
The Westman court cited Monsanto6 2 as Supreme Court authority for
its rejection of the per se rule in this case. The court read Monsanto as
requiring an allegation of some form of price-fixing to invoke per se illegality. 63 Since the trial court record revealed no such allegation, Hobart's action was not per se illegal. 64
In applying the rule of reason, the Tenth Circuit stressed manufacturer discretion and "sound economic theory." Initially, the court adhered to the decisional flexibility espoused in Schwinn. 6 5 In Schwinn, the
Court stated that a manufacturer of a competitive product ought to have
56 Id at 636-37. See also infra note 67.
57 796 F.2d at 1220 (emphasis added).
58 Id (emphasis added). Recall that the court in Cernuto stressed the impact of the vertical restraints on the market participants. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
59 796 F.2d at 1222.
60 Id at 1223 (quoting Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d
660, 663 (7th Cir. 1982)). See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. See also Hennessey Indus.,
Inc. v. FMC Corp., 779 F.2d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit adopted this reasoning in
Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986).
61 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. In addition to the Third Circuit, the Sixth,
Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the per se rule to a manufacturer who terminates a distributor at the request of a competing distributor. See, e.g., Victorian House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto Corp.,
769 F.2d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 1985); Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465,
1470 (9th Cir. 1983); and Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-Car Drivaway, Inc., 691 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir.
1982). These courts reasoned that such a restraint, "although actually a vertical restraint, 'becomes
primarily horizontal in nature' because of the participation of the distributor who seeks to 'suppress
its competition by utilizing the power of a common supplier.' " 796 F.2d at 1223 (quoting Cernuto,
Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1979)). See supra note 27 and accompanying
text. The Westman court distinguished these cases, however, on the ground that most of them involved price-fixing motives. 796 F.2d at 1223.
62 See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
63 796 F.2d at 1224. The Westman court, quoting a portion of a Fifth Circuit decision, stated:
"The language of Monsanto can only indicate the Court's belief that apricefixingagreement is a requirementfor per se liability in distributor termination cases." Id. (quoting Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp
Elec. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1214 n.9 (5th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis added by Westman).
64 796 F.2d at 1224.
65 Recall that Schwinn was partially overruled by Sylvania. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
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wide latitude in selecting its customers. 66 Under this theory, a manufacturer may also restrict product distribution, even in the absence of
equivalent brands in the market, 67 unless the manufacturer enjoys "market power." 68 This determination requires a court to employ a market
analysis, focusing on whether products, which a purchaser can substitute
when faced with relevant price increases, exist in the market place. 69
Additionally, the majority concluded that "sound economic theory
supported the cases that have allowed suppliers wide latitude in selecting
their distributors. ' 70 Citing to various economic and legal scholars 7 1 and
to Sylvania, 72 the court stated that "[t]he only real incentive a manufacturer has to restrict distribution of its product is to make its product
more competitive." 73 Although a refusal to deal with certain distributors
may reduce intrabrand competition, Posnerian analysis suggests that it
74
will ultimately benefit consumers by increasing interbrand rivalry.
66 "[A] manufacturer of a product other and equivalent brands of which are readily available in
the market may select his customers, and for this purpose he may 'franchise' certain dealers to
whom, alone, he will sell his goods." Westman, 796 F.2d at 1225 (quoting Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 376).
See also supra note 16 and accompanying text. Although Westman did not involve a franchise arrangement, the court felt that this general reasoning should be extended to allow manufacturers to restrict
distribution of their products. 796 F.2d at 1225.
67 Testimony in the trial court indicated that the market lacked acceptable alternatives to Hobart's products at an equivalent price. An expert in food facilities design testified that he could not
recall any specifications that he had prepared in which the customer had not requested some Hobart
items. 461 F. Supp. at 628. The circuit court, however, downplayed this evidence. The majority felt
that the "trial court's approach subjected Hobart to especially strict antitrust treatment simply because it produced high quality products and sold them at a price lower than that demanded for
competing products of equal quality." 796 F.2d at 1225.
68 796 F.2d at 1225. The court defined market power as "the ability to raise prices above those
that would be charged in a competitive market." Id. at n.3. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ.
of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2965 n.38 (1984), where the majority distinguished "market power" from
"monopoly power," which is the ability to control prices and exclude competition. For a discussion
of "monopoly power," see Shoppin' Bag of Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 783 F.2d 159, 163-64 (10th
Cir. 1986). Market power requires a lesser showing of evidence on the part of the plaintiff. This
lesser showing is justified because a manufacturer may be able to maintain a supracompetitive price
without directly being able to exclude competition.
69 The court explained that this requires a determination of product competition pursuant to
two factors:
(a) The reasonable interchangeability of use to which two or more products can be put.
This factor, in turn, is satisfied when two or more products (i) have essentially similar physical characteristics, or (ii) can be put to use for the same purpose.
(b) The cross elasticity of demand, i.e., the extent to which consumer preference shifts
freely between two or more products.

796 F.2d at 1226.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1226-27 (citing Bock, An Economist Appraises Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTrTRUST BULL. 117,
120-21 (1985); Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 171, 180-81; Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANrrrusT L.J. 135, 140-53 (1984); Posner, The
Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 23

(1981)).
72 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
73 796 F.2d at 1226 (citing Posner, supra note 71, at 23).
74 796 F.2d at 1227. The court listed four reasons why limiting intrabrand competition would
benefit the consumer:
(1) limiting the number of its distributors reduces a manufacturer's distribution costs by
allowing each distributor to achieve economies of scale and to spread out fixed costs over a
large amount of products; (2) new manufacturers are invited to enter the market through
the encouragement of distributors making the necessary investment to carry a new manufacturer's product; (3) distributors are encouraged to offer promotional activities, consumer
information, and product service without fear of being underpriced by a "free-rider;" and
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Finally, the court criticized the trial court's failure to undertake a
"thorough" rule of reason analysis. The court posited that such an approach would have found that Hobart's refusal to grant a distributorship
to Westman did not reduce interbrand competition in the Denver-area
restaurant equipment supply market. 75 Although this flawed application
of the rule of reason, standing alone, would normally require a remand
to the trial court, the circuit court found remand unnecessary since "Hobart's refusal to grant Westman a distributorship did not violate section
one of the Sherman Act ....
76
III.

Defining the Rule of Reason

Westman asserts that the rule of reason represents the proper standard for adjudicating nonprice dealer termination cases. This holding is
consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the issue,
which now indicate that the per se rule never applies to nonprice vertical
restraints. 7 7 Still, terminated dealers plead for, and some lower courts
apply, per se illegality treatment where complaints from a competing
dealer accompany a dealer termination. 78 In asserting that this type of
vertical restraint becomes horizontal in nature, the Cernuto line of cases
emphasizes that the restraint is based solely on the anticompetitive motive of the competitor. 7 9 On its face, this argument seems valid. Further
analysis, however, reveals that the rule of reason effectively adjudicates
nonprice dealer terminations.
As Westman indicated, antitrust laws were enacted for the protection
of the consumer. Any antitrust claim must be judged by "its effect on
consumers, not on competitors. ' 80 Consequently, the anticompetitive
desire of a competing dealer carries less weight if the restraint has no
adverse impact on the consumer's choices in the market. 8 1 In a nonprice
(4) a manufacturer reduces its transaction costs by dealing only with distributors with whom
it feels it can enjoy a smooth working relationship.
Id. See also supra note 14.
75 796 F.2d at 1228. The majority failed to specifically delineate, however, the various factors
which would encompass a "thorough" rule of reason analysis. The decision stated that the district
court properly explained the rule of reason, yet failed to sufficiently apply it. Apparently, the Tenth
Circuit agreed with the trial court's characterization that "[tihe rule of reason requires a complex
determination of the effect of a given business arrangement or agreement on competition and the
possible justifications of any adverse effects." 461 F. Supp. at 636.
76 796 F.2d at 1228.
77 See supra notes 5-20 & 29-36 and accompanying text.
78 See supra notes 25-28, 37-38 & 52-56 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 27 & 61 and accompanying text. See also Piraino, DistributorTerminationsPursuant
to ConspiraciesAmong a Supplier and ComplainingDistributors:A SuggestedAntitrust Analysis, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 297 (1982). Piraino suggests a two step analysis to adjudicating these types of restraints. First,
the terminated dealer must prove the existence of an agreement between the supplier and the complaining dealer. If this is shown, the burden of proof shifts to the supplier to show a legitimate
business motive for initiating the termination independent of the anticompetitive desire of the complaining dealer. The per se rule would apply if the restraint would not have been effected "but for"
the complaints of the competing distributor. If the supplier had an independent justification, the
rule of reason would be the proper analysis. Id. at 319-20.
80 796 F.2d at 1220. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
81 The anticompetitive desire of a competing dealer is only one element of the rule of reason
while the per se test considers it to be dispositive. See supra notes 4 & 12 and accompanying text and
infra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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dealer termination case, then, the crucial inquiry focuses on the restraint's impact on the consumer market. Courts which invoke the per se
rule often fail to address this important issue.8 2 The rule of reason, however, satisfies this inquiry.8 3 Therefore, Westman was correct in refusing
to find the termination per se illegal.
Beyond the facts of the case at issue, Westman may also represent a
trend that advocates a radical change in antitrust law. The Tenth Circuit
cites articles written by Judge Posner,8 4 Judge Easterbrook,8 5 and economist Betty Bock8 6 as authority for its holding. These three authors have
called for the abolition of the per se rule with respect to all vertical
restraints.
This view, also accepted by the Justice Department,8 7 posits that

price and nonprice terms for transactions are interrelated and should not
be treated differently.8 8 By this theory, every restricted dealing arrangement has as its basis the desire to influence price.8 9 Even the Supreme
Court, in Monsanto, recognized the difficulty in distinguishing between
the two arrangements. 90 Thus, a unified approach to all vertical restraints would end much of the current confusion present in the courts.
Economic theory forms the foundation of this analysis. The theory
assumes that a manufacturer will only impose restraints which will increase its competitiveness and, therefore, help the consumer. 9 1 Because
the focus of antitrust law is the consumer, 9 2 most vertical arrangements,
based on the assumptions of this theory, will withstand a section one
93
challenge.
Section one of the Sherman Act is not designed to interfere with
unilateral acts by a manufacturer. 9 4 Rather, a conspiracy must exist. 95 A

manufacturer may unilaterally restrict its price to help its business; however, it may not employ the same price restriction if it acts in concert with
a distributor. This action constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman
Act. Given the ease with which courts will find a conspiracy, 9 6 however,
even an arguably unilateral restriction may be deemed per se illegal.
The abolitionists view this as a serious dilemma for business executives. If a distributor alerts a manufacturer that another distributor is
acting adversely to its interests, the manufacturer is limited in possible
responses to the complaint. Once it receives the complaint, it may have
82 See supra note 4.
83 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
84 Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 CHI. L.
REV. 6 (1981).

85 Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984).
86 Bock, An Economist Appraises Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTTRUST BULL. 117 (1985).
87 See Baxter, Vertical Restraints and Resale Price Maintenance: A 'Rule of Reason' Approach, 14 ANTITRUST L. ECON. REV. 13 (1982).

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

See Bock, supra note 86, at 123.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 14 (1984).
104 S. Ct. at 1470. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
Bock, supra note 86, at 122-23.
See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
Easterbrook, supra note 85, at 158.
See generally Colgate, supra note 10.
See supra note 2.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

1987]

CASE COMMENTS

to abandon any restrictions, price or nonprice, because any action taken
subsequent to a complaint may be seen as an agreement to fix prices
under a Cernuto analysis. 9 7 This uncertainty results in an inhibition of
internal business communication. Thus, the per se rule arguably impedes important business functions.
Even if this theory is not accepted in its entirety, the underlying rationale dearly supports abolition of the per se rule to nonprice distributor terminations. One must assume that the manufacturer who
terminates a distributor for reasons other than to restrain prices does so
to strengthen his position in the market.9 8 Through the creation of a
more efficient distribution process, the manufacturer benefits the consumer by reducing overhead costs and encouraging distributors to actively promote the product.9 9 In order to determine whether these
00
assumptions are correct, courts must apply the rule of reason analysis.'
Courts can determine whether the termination actually benefits or harms
consumers by scrutinizing the restraint with an eye toward its effect on
competition. Such a consideration is not possible under a per se analysis.
IV. Conclusion
Westman holds that the per se rule does not apply to nonprice distributor termination cases. Rather, the rule of reason represents the proper
standard for adjudicating such claims. Westman also indicates a possible
trend in antitrust law toward abolishing the per se rule in all vertical arrangements-price as well as nonprice. Whether or not this broad theory is adopted, its rationale clearly supports the conclusion that the per
se rule should not apply in cases of nonprice dealer terminations.
Although current thinking applies the rule of reason analysis in nonprice
vertical restraint cases, plaintiffs still successfully plead and prove per se
liability in some federal courts. The circuit court decision in Cernuto and
the trial court decision in Westman are prime examples of this
inconsistency.
Antitrust laws are designed to benefit the consumer. Therefore,
dealer terminations must be judged by their effect on the market. The
per se rule fails to fully scrutinize impact on the consumer. The rule of
reason analysis is the only test which provides adequate inquiry into a
restraint's economic impact on the consumer. Therefore, the rule of reason should be the only standard invoked to adjudicate cases alleging a
nonprice dealer termination.
Brian M. English
Susan M. Faccenda
Jeffrey D. Linton
JohnJ. O'Shea
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Posner, supra note 84, at 13.
See supra notes 73-74 & 91-93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.

TORT LAW-BARRETT

V. UNITED STATES: ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY WRONGFULLY EXTENDED TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL DEFENDING THE STATE
IN A CIVIL ACTION

The Supreme Court has held that government officials performing
certain critical functions should receive immunity from civil liability.' Attorneys general have traditionally been among those government officials able to claim some degree of immunity. 2 Like most officials,
attorneys general can receive either absolute or qualified immunity if acting within the scope of their authority.3 Although it is well established4
that state officials prosecuting criminal cases receive absolute immunity,
the Supreme Court has not yet addressed what degree of immunity a
state attorney general requires while defending the state in a civil action. 5
1 See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (witnesses); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731
(1982) (president); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978) (administrative officials); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors);
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (legislators); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)
(legislators).
2 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985); Henderson v. Lopez, 790 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1986);
Mother Goose Nursery Schools, Inc. v. Sendah, 770 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
884 (1986); Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 810 (1986);
Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d 990 (3d Cir. 1980).
3 Courts conduct a functional analysis to determine what type of immunity to grant government
officials, including attorneys general. The key factor is whether the government attorney is performing a prosecutorial function. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976), the Supreme
Court granted immunity to attorneys performing prosecutorial functions. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. The Court left open the question of whether absolute immunity extends to "those
aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative
officer," and thus outside of his role as a prosecutor. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31. Subsequently,
courts have generally ruled that attorneys general are not entitled to absolute immunity for acts
taken in their investigative or administrative capacity. See, e.g., Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600
(7th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980); Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d 990 (3d
Cir. 1980); Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 456 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The Supreme Court
has implicitly accepted this distinction "in extending absolute immunity to executive officials when
they are engaged in quasi-prosecutorial functions." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 n. 16
(1982).
4 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Siano v.Justices of Mass., 698 F.2d 52 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983); Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1980); Taylor v. Nichols, 558
F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1977); Cerborne v. County of Westchester, 508 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Voytko v. Ramada Inn of Atlantic City, 445 F. Supp. 315 (D.N.J. 1978).
5 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Ellison v. Stephens, 581 F.2d 584
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978). In Ellison, the administrator of an estate brought a
§ 1983 action against the state attorney general. The § 1983 claim arose from the attorney general's
defense of the state against the estate's wrongful death action. In defending this action, the attorney
general raised the doctrine of sovereign immunity, asserting that it barred the claim against the
commonwealth. The court held that the state attorney general could not be sued under § 1983 for
raising sovereign immunity as a defense to a civil action. This decision, however, is not persuasive in
comparison to Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1986). The attorney general in Ellison
raised a legal defense to a civil claim. The court noted that this action did not infringe upon any
constitutional provision or federal law when asserted. Consequently, the court found the action to
be an "integral part of the judicial process" under Inbler. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
In contrast, the attorney general in Barrett did not raise a recognized legal defense on behalf of the
state. Rather, he conspired with the federal attorneys, suppressed evidence, and suborned perjury.
Barrett, 798 F.2d at 576-77. These actions clearly infringe on constitutional rights and state laws and
thus are not within the scope or intent of the Ellison decision.
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently faced this issue
in Barrett v. United States,6 when the Assistant Attorney General for the
State of New York participated in a cover-up as he defended the state in a
civil action for damages. The court of appeals, in granting absolute immunity to the state attorney general, applied the Supreme Court's functional analysis improperly and failed to consider a recent Supreme Court
decision which eliminated the need for absolute immunity in circumstances similar to the Barrett situation.
Part I of this comment outlines the facts and holding of Barrett. Part
II briefly sketches the development of common law and statutory immunity for government officials involved in the judicial process. Part III
summarizes the court's reasoning in Barrett and criticizes the court's analysis. Finally, Part IV concludes that the extension of absolute immunity
to a state attorney general defending a state in a civil action is
unwarranted.
I.

Barrett v. United States

Elizabeth Barrett, successor representative of the Harold Blauer estate, 7 sued certain state and federal attorneys under 42 U.S.C. section
19838 to recover damages resulting from the attorneys' alleged misconduct in connection with a wrongful death suit filed by Mr. Blauer's estate
in 1953. 9 Elizabeth Barrett alleged that defendant attorneys deliberately
deprived the estate of its property right in the 1953 Court of Claims action by "covering up" the facts and circumstances of Mr. Blauer's
death.10
Mr. Blauer, a patient at the New York State Psychiatric Institute
(NYSPI), died in January 1953 after receiving a series of injections of a
mescaline derivative."1 The United States Army Chemical Corps sup6 798 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1986).
7 Amy Blauer, decedent Harold Blauer's estranged wife, originally represented Mr. Blauer's
estate. Mrs. Blauer filed suit against the State of New York in 1953 after she received notice that her
husband had died while receiving treatment at the New York State Psychiatric Hospital. Id. at 567.
8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory ....
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
9 Elizabeth Barrett, daughter of Harold Blauer, originally filed the § 1983 suit in 1975, following an announcement by the Secretary of the Army that Harold Blauer had died while unknowingly
serving as a test subject for an Army Chemical Corps experiment. The District Court for the Souther District of New York dismissed the suit as barred by the statute of limitations. Barrett v. Hoffman, 521 F. Supp. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
district court decision on the theory that Barrett's cause of action did not accrue until 1975, because
Barrett was innocently unaware of the claim until that time. Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324
(2d Cir. 1982).
10 Barrett, 798 F.2d at 575.
11 The injection that caused Blauer's death was the fifth in a series to which Blauer had reacted
unfavorably. Id. at 575. Medical records disclosed to the estate during discovery stated that Blauer
had been subjected to a drug study "for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes," and that his death
resulted from an "unexpected and totally atypical response." Id. at 569. Although the NYSPI supervising doctor knew that the purpose of the injections was to test the drug's effects for chemical
warfare, the NYSPI staff did not inform Blauer or his family of this purpose. The New York City
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plied the drug to NYSPI pursuant to a secret contract to test the drug's
suitability for chemical warfare purposes. 12 Mr. Blauer's estranged wife,
as administratrix of the estate, sued the State of New York in the New
York Court of Claims in 1953. Mrs. Blauer was not aware of the Army's
drug testing program. Her suit alleged negligent misconduct by the
state-employed personnel at NYSPI.13 The state assigned then Assistant
State Attorney General David Marcus to defend the case. His investigation revealed the Army Chemical Corps' involvement in Blauer's death.14
Recognizing that the Army classified much of the relevant information as
secret, Marcus arranged a meeting with the Army litigation division in
January 1954 to discuss the case. The federal government agreed to pay
one half of any settlement Marcus negotiated with the estate. 15
Marcus again met with representatives of the federal government in
July 1954.16 At this meeting, the federal attorneys insisted that Marcus
17
not reveal the Army Chemical Corps' chemical warfare experiments.
Instead, a Department of Justice attorney told Marcus to limit the legal
proceedings to the medical aspects of the case.' 8 The federal attorneys
instructed Marcus that if it became necessary to reveal that the Army had
supplied the mescaline derivative which caused Blauer's death, he should
identify the Army Medical Corps, and not the Army Chemical Corps, as
the source of the drug. 19 To avoid disclosing the Army Chemical Corps'
drug testing contract with NYSPI, Marcus repeatedly postponed the pre20
trial depositions of NYSPI doctors.
Marcus negotiated a $15,000 settlement with the estate, 2 ' and the
matter proceeded to a Court of Claims settlement hearing. Prior to this
hearing, Marcus secretly met with the Court of Claims judge to inform
him of the United States Government's involvement in Mr. Blauer's
death. 2 2 He persuaded the judge to conceal this information in the interMedical Examiner's death certificate listed the cause of Blauer's death as "[c]oronary arteriosclerosis; sudden death after intravenous injection of a mescaline derivative." Id. at 567.
12 The contract contained a provision forbidding any disclosure of the drug testing agreement.
Id. at 567.
13 Id. at 568.
14 Id.
15 Marcus reached an agreement with the federal attorneys in which he would attempt to settle
the case and keep secret the Army's role and purpose in supplying the drug. In exchange, the federal government agreed to pay half of any settlement Marcus negotiated with the estate. Id. at 567.
16 Marcus attended a conference in Washington onJuly 12, 1954. The federal attorneys, several
of them appellants here, included Harris J. North, then an attorney with the United States Army
Judge Advocate General Corps, Herbert K. Greer, then Legal Advisor to the Chief Chemical Officer,
Army Chemical Corps, and George S. Leonard, then first assistant to the Assistant Attorney General
for the Civil Division, United States Department ofJustice. Id. at 568.
17 The federal attorneys threatened to prosecute, under the Federal Espionage Act, anyone (including Marcus) who revealed the Army Chemical Corps' involvement. Id. at 577. Mr. Leonard
"forcibly informed" Marcus that pretrial discovery and any other further proceedings should be
limited to the medical aspects of the case. He objected strongly to disclosure of the Army-NYSPI
contract, its purpose, and the results of the experiment. Id. at 568-69. See also Barrett v. United
States, 689 F.2d 324, 328 (2d Cir. 1982).
18 Barrett, 798 F.2d at 568.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 569.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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est of national security. 23 At the settlement hearing, Marcus handed certain NYSPI medical records to the judge but did not turn them over to
the estate's counsel.2 4 Dr. Hoch, an NYSPI physician, testified at the settlement hearing that the injection of the drug was not in accordance with
generally accepted medical practice. 2 5 Dr. Hoch did not reveal the purpose of the injection or the Army Chemical Corps' role in supplying the
drug. 26 Marcus prepared the settlement agreement which released the
state and the "governmental body" or agency which had furnished the
drug from liability. The plaintiff, Mrs. Blauer, signed the release, assum27
ing that an agency of the State of New York had supplied the drug.

In her section 1983 suit, plaintiff Elizabeth Barrett alleged that Marcus misled the estate about the cause of Mr. Blauer's death by knowingly
giving the estate inaccurate medical records, ignoring a court order for
discovery of other relevant medical records classified as secret by the
Army, and deliberately concealing material evidence. 2 8 The district
court granted absolute immunity to David Marcus and dismissed the
claim against him. The court granted qualified immunity to the federal
against them. The Court of
attorneys and refused to dismiss the claim
29
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
II. Development of Tort Immunity for Government Officials
A.

Doctrine of Immunity

Courts have granted immunity from tort liability to certain classes of
federal and state employees based on their status as government officials.
When a court grants immunity to an official, it does not deny the existence of the tort. Rather, it holds that the plaintiff cannot subject the
23 See the discussion of the facts of this case in Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir.
1982), where the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of Ms. Barrett's action on
statute of limitations grounds.
24 Upon learning of the nature of the Army's involvement, the judge increased the settlement
amount to $18,000. Banrett, 798 F.2d at 569. The Department of the Army paid $9,000 to the State
of New York to cover one half of the settlement. Id. at 570.
25 "[While conceding that the injections were not in accordance with generally accepted medical routine, Hoch testifed falsely before the New York Court of Claims that the drug was a derivative
compound commonly used by the profession for the purposes of diagnosing certain types of psychiatric ills ..... Id. at 576. In fact, Dr. Hoch and Marcus both knew that the newly developed compound was being administered as an experiment to study its effects for chemical war purposes. Id.
26 Dr. Hoch testified that Blauer received a commonly-used, well-known, safe drug so that his
condition "could best be diagnosed and treatment thereafter given." Id. at 576. In contrast, Dr.
Hoch stated to Marcus and the others present at theJuly 12, 1954 meeting that "he would not have
used the new compound for experimental purposes but for the NYSPI's contract with the Army."
He also stated that the "experimental nature of the treatment made it a departure from acceptable
medical practice." Id. at 568.
27 Id. at 570.
It is alleged that the concealment was further effectuated by Marcus' knowing participation
in an alleged fraud upon the estate through ... his inducement of the estate to sign a
release prepared by him which barred claims against the "government body" supplying the
lethal derivative with which Blauer was injected without revealing that the "government"
supplier was not the State of New York, as the estate assumed, but the Army Chemical
Corps.
Id. at 577.
28 Id. at 570.
29 Id.
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alleged tortfeasor to suit because of the defendant's function as a govern30
ment official.
Courts have recognized both absolute and qualified immunity. An
official cloaked with absolute immunity from liability is not amenable to a
tort action if his actions are within the scope of his duties as a government official, even if he acts intentionally or with malice. 3 ' An official with
qualified immunity, however, is not amenable
to suit if he acts within the
2
scope of his duties and acts in good faith.3
The procedural impact of granting immunity varies according to the
type of immunity granted.3 3 If the court determines that the defendantgovernment official has absolute immunity, the plaintiff's complaint is
dismissed, precluding discovery. 34 Thus, such actions never continue
beyond the pleading stage, and the defendant-government official does
not have to defend his actions in court. Qualified immunity allows the
plaintiff to continue his suit until the court determines as a matter of law
that the official did not violate a known constitutional right. 3 5
B.

Immunity from Common Law Liability

Courts gave judges,3 6 grand jurors,3 7 and prosecutors3 8 absolute immunity from common law liability in tort. Claimants subjected these offi30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Chapter 45A, Introductory Note (1979).
31 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418 n.12. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
32 "It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all
the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
247-48 (1974). The Supreme Court modified this standard, at least with regard to qualified immunity from liability in § 1983 actions, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See infra notes
109-17 and accompanying text.
33 The defendant-government official may either raise the absolute immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment (FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b)) or in the responsive pleading (FED. R. Civ. P.
12(a)). If raised in the responsive pleading, the defendant then may make a motion forjudgment on
the pleadings (FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c)).
34 Since the question of whether a defendant is entitled to absolute immunity is one of law, the
court will dismiss a suit upon granting absolute immunity. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731
(1982).
35 See infra notes 109-17. Before Harlow, 457 U.S. 800, if the court determined that a particular
defendant was entitled only to qualified immunity from liability in a common law tort action, the
action usually proceeded to trial. Most courts held that the question of an official's good faith was
one of fact and thus a jury question. Procedurally, a question of fact is not disposable on summary
judgment. Id. at 816. Harlow altered this good faith standard in regard to qualified immunity in
§ 1983 actions, thus lessening the procedural differences between the types of immunity.
36 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). In Bradley, the plaintiff, one of the attorneys
for John H. Suratt in Suratt's trial for the murder of Abraham Lincoln, alleged that defendant, the
presiding judge at the trial, had with malice struck plaintiff's name from the roll of attorneys practicing in the court. The Court granted the defendant judge absolute immunity. Id. at 354.
37 Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (1880).
38 Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896). Griffith represents the first American
case to deal with the issue of prosecutorial immunity. The first such case to come before the United
States Supreme Court was Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), af'd men., 275 U.S. 503
(1927). In Yaselli, the court of appeals held that:
[T]he Attorney General of the United States, in the performance of the duties imposed
upon him by law, is immune from a civil action for malicious prosecution based on an indictment and prosecution, although it results in a verdict of not guilty rendered by a jury.
The immunity is absolute, and is grounded on principles of public policy.
Id. at 406.
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cials most frequently to such tort actions as malicious prosecution 39 and
defamation. 40 The courts did not grant this immunity to protect the intentional wrongdoer. Rather, courts granted this immunity to protect
the public interest in having officials perform their duties without fear of
lawsuit. 4 1 The courts afforded absolute immunity to grand jurors, prosecutors, and judges because all of these officials exercised discretion in
evaluating evidence, 4 2 and thus might likewise be subject to suit by a dissatisfied litigant.
C. Immunity From Section 1983 Liability
On its face, section 1983 grants no immunities. 43 Since 1951, however, the United States Supreme Court has held that certain government
officials performing particular functions should be afforded immunity
from liability in section 1983 actions. 4 4 The Supreme Court has afforded
46
absolute immunity from section 1983 liability to judges, 45 witnesses,
4
7
prosecutors, and officials performing adjudicatory functions within administrative agencies. 48 The Court has found that the reasons whichjus39 Yaselli, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926). In Yaselli, plaintiff alleged that defendant and others had
maliciously procured an indictment of the plaintiff using false evidence. At the criminal trial, the
court directed a verdict of not guilty against plaintiff (who was one of the defendants at that time).
40 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1958) (federal official who was acting director of the Office of
Rent Stabilization granted absolute privilege in a defamation action); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483
(1896) (the Postmaster General granted absolute privilege).
41 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418 n.12. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
42 Id. at 423 n.20. Such officials' conduct and the immunity which the courts afforded them were
termed "quasi-judicial" for this reason. Courts afforded prosecutors absolute immunity from common law liability because of "concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his
decisions instead of exercising the independence ofjudgment required by his public trust." Id. at
423.
43 Justice William O. Douglas has argued for a strict reading of the statute, which would allow no
immunities. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 383 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It was indeed the purpose of this
civil rights legislation to secure federal rights against invasion by officers and agents of the states. I
see no reason why any officer of government should be higher than the'Constitution from which all
rights and privileges of an office obtain.").
44 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
45 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (Court regarded judicial immunity as essential to
protect the integrity of thejudicial process). See also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judge
whose actions are related to those normally performed by a judge and whom the parties expect is
acting in a judicial capacity is absolutely immune from liability in a § 1983 action). Cf. Lynch v.
Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970) (judge who presides at county fiscal board meetings not
entitled to immunity). For a history of judicial immunity, see Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the
History of Inmunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 878.
46 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). In Briscoe, the Court held that a state convicted defendant cannot sue a police officer in a § 1983 action based on allegations of perjury because the
Court found nothing in the legislative history of § 1983 which revealed an intention to abrogate
common law witness immunity, especially for police officers.
47 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). See infra note 51 and accompanying text. However,
the Supreme Court has held that a public defender is entitled to no immunity. Ferri v. Ackerman,
444 U.S. 193 (1979). See also Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984) (state public defender likened to
the English barrister, who has never been granted immunity from liability for intentional
misconduct).
48 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Butz involved a suit againstfederal officials of the
Department of Agriculture in which the plaintiff alleged deprivation of constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court has held that the same standards of immunity should apply to both state officials sued
under § 1983 andfederal officials "sued on similar grounds under causes of action founded directly
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in common law tort actions apply
tify absolute immunity from liability
49
equally to section 1983 actions.
By far, most court decisions regarding immunity of government officials from section 1983 liability have involved prosecutors and other officials with functions which the courts have termed "quasi-judicial." 50
With regard to prosecutors, the Supreme Court has held that the public
interest in allowing the prosecutor to freely execute his duties outweighs
the injury to the genuinely wronged criminal defendant deprived of his
liberty by a prosecutor's actions. On this basis, the Court granted5 1a prosecutor absolute immunity from liability in section 1983 actions.
III.

Absolute Immunity: An Inquiry Based on Scope of
Authority, Function, and Public Policy
A.

Scope of Authority

The Barrett court extended absolute immunity to an assistant attorney general defending the state in a civil suit. In cases where immunity is
at issue, courts have generally used a two-step inquiry. 5 2 The first step is
whether the defendant is entitled to any immunity whatsoever. This deon the Constitution." Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 695 n.7
(1976). In Butz, the Supreme Court first applied Imbler's absolute prosecutorial immunity to a government official not acting as a prosecutor. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. The plaintiff in
Butz alleged that certain members of the Department of Agriculture, by initiating administrative
proceedings against him without proper notice, denied him due process of law. Those named as
defendants included the Judicial Officer, the Chief Hearing Examiner, and the attorney who had
prosecuted the enforcement proceeding. 438 U.S. at 508. The Supreme Court refused to grant all
of the individual defendants absolute immunity, ruling that federal officials who "seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must bear the burden of showing that
public policy requires an exemption of that scope." Id. at 506. The Court held that federal executive officials are entitled only to qualified immunity, "subject to those exceptional situations where it
is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business." Id. at
507. The Court later relied on Imbler, concluding that since the adjudication process within a federal
administrative agency has many of the characteristics of the judicial process, and several of the officials performed functions similar to those of prosecutors and judges, these officials should be absolutely immune from liability. Id. at 516.
49 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418 ("[S]ection 1983 is to be read in harmony with general principles of
[common law] tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.").
50 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51 In Imbler, the Supreme Court first addressed the question of what type of immunity from
§ 1983 liability should be granted to a state prosecuting attorney acting within the scope of his
prosecutorial duties. Paul Imbler had been convicted of felony murder. After his conviction, Imbler
filed a § 1983 action, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. Imbler argued that a prosecutor, as a
member of the executive branch, could claim only the qualified immunity afforded other members of
the executive branch, and not the absolute immunity usually afforded the judiciary. The Court rejected this argument, stating that it did not grant immunity predicated on the particular branch of
government of the official, but rather on a "considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it." 424 U.S. at 421. In articulating its holding, the Supreme Court clearly delineated the boundaries of its decision, stating:
We have no occasion to consider whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those
aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or
investigative officer rather than that of advocate. We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.
Id. at 430-31 (footnotes omitted). See also infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
52 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly outlined this two-step inquiry, the analysis is
implicit in its decisions. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 492; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
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termination depends on whether or not the defendant was acting within
his authority when he committed the violation in question. If he was not
acting within his authority, he is not entitled to any immunity.53 Only
after the court determines this threshold issue should it determine what
type of immunity, qualified or absolute, to grant the defendant.
The Barrett court failed to address this threshold issue. Rather, the
court assumed that the defendant was entitled to some form of immunity
and simply proceeded to determine whether that immunity should be
qualified or absolute. By doing this, the Barrett court departed from the
general rule that a federal official may not ignore the limitations which
54
the controlling law places on his powers.
This general rule originated as a means of protecting federal officials
in the execution of their federal statutory duties from criminal or civil
actions based on state law. 55 Thus, a federal official was protected only if
his acts were authorized by controlling federal law. 56 Although this rule
originated in regard to federal officials, it applies equally to state officials.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that it would be untenable to draw
a distinction between federal and state officials for the purposes of deter57
mining immunity.
An analysis of the facts in Barrett supports the contention that Assistant Attorney General Marcus was not acting within the scope of his authority when he violated section 1983. Although Marcus purportedly
acted for the benefit of the state he was defending, 58 his actions violated
New York Penal Laws 5 9 regarding conspiracy to obstruct justice, 60 suppression of evidence, 6 1 and subornation of perjury. 6 2 Marcus attended
the July 12, 1954 meeting where the federal attorneys planned their
strategy for ensuring Mr. Blauer's estate would not discover the Army
53 Butz, 438 U.S. at 494 (citing Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896)) (circular issued by Postmaster General not beyond the scope of his official duties); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574 (1959)
(press release within agency director's discretionary authority).
54 Butz, 438 U.S. at 489.
55 Id. See also Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 865-66 (1824); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
56 "To make out his [the official's] defence [sic] he must show that his authority was sufficient in
law to protect him." Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 452 (1883).
57 The Court reasoned that ifa distinction was made between state and federal officials for purposes of immunity law it would create a system in which the Bill of Rights monitored the conduct of
state officials more closely than it did that of federal officials. To do this, said the Court, would
"stand the constitutional design on its head." Butz, 438 U.S. at 504.
58 Petitioner's brief disputes this point, contending that Marcus' fraudulent concealment of
facts, subornation of perjury and conspiratorial actions were taken with and for the benefit of nonparties to the lawsuit he was defending. Specifically, Petitioner's brief argued that Marcus conspired
with representatives of the federal government in order to prevent disclosure of the federal government's role in the death of Harold Blauer. Petitioner contended that Marcus acted solely for the
benefit of the federal government, in order to forestall a second lawsuit against the government.
Consequently, Petitioner suggested that applying absolute prosecutorial immunity in this context
broke new and "uncalled for" ground by expanding the limited privilege to a degree detrimental to
the governmental system. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee and Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant at 42, 44-45,
Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1986).
59 Curiously, the Barrett court only discussed these penal law violations in its discussion of the
federal attorney defendants. Barrett, 798 F.2d at 575-76.
60 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 580 (McKinney 1944).
61 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 814 (McKinney 1944).
62 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1620 (McKinney 1944).
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Chemical Corps' involvement. 63 At this meeting Marcus learned that the
federal attorneys planned to identify the Army Medical Corps as the
source of the mescaline compound if necessary, that the federal attorneys
intended to remove the Chemical Corps' contract with NYSPI to Maryland where they would be beyond the estate's subpoena power, and that
64
the unclassified records he would later release to the estate were false.
At this meeting, Dr. Hoch stated that he would not have used the compound but for the NYSPI's contract with the Army and that the treatment's experimental nature was a departure from accepted medical
practice which, if disclosed, would support a finding of negligence. In
contrast, the classified records stated that Mr. Blauer had been subjected
to a " 'drug study for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes' which resulted in an 'unexpected and totally atypical response.' "65
Although Marcus may have been initially reluctant to take part in
this plan, 6 6 he ratified his position as a coconspirator by repeatedly postponing the pretrial examination of NYSPI doctors, by eliciting Dr.
Hoch's false testimony during the settlement hearing, and by furnishing,
upon request for discovery, only the unclassified NYSPI records he knew
67
to be false.
These criminal violations clearly place Marcus' actions beyond the
scope of his authority. For any court to suggest otherwise would be incongruous. Instead, it is apparent that Marcus ignored an express statutory limitation on his authority. 68 The Supreme Court has never
63 Barrett, 798 F.2d at 569. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
64 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
65 Barrett, 798 F.2d at 569. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
66 According to a "Chronological Statement of Facts" prepared by the Army's office of the
Judge Advocate General, at the meeting ofJuly 12, 1954, Marcus was "forcibly informed" that he
should limit the proceedings to the medical aspects of the case. Barrett, 798 F.2d at 568. Moreover,
Marcus' deposition testimony indicated that the federal attorneys forced him to take part in the
illegal activities by threatening him personally with prosecution under the Federal Espionage Act.
Id. at 577. See also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
67 In addition to Marcus' criminal violations, the estate would have had a private cause of action
against him in 1953 for violation of the New York Penal Laws. NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 273 (McKinney 1944), superseded by N.Y. JUD. LAw § 487 (1967), authorized treble damages recovery against an
attorney "guilty of any deceit or collusion with intent to deceive the court or any party." As the
Barrett court noted when it discussed the federal defendants, § 273 was construed as providing a civil
remedy to parties injured by a deceitful attorney. Barrett, 798 F.2d at 576. See In re Bregoff, 258 A.D.
551, 557, 17 N.Y.S.2d 816, 821 (1940); Nones v. Security Title and Guar. Co., 4 Misc. 2d 1057, 162
N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Fields v. Turner, 1 Misc. 2d 679, 147 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
68 Not only did Marcus exceed statutory limitations but he exceeded ethical limitations as well.
Both the American Bar Association and the Supreme Court have recognized the danger of presenting false evidence or otherwise violating the law in advocating a case. Two different codifications of
uniform standards of professional responsibility contain provisions limiting the scope of representation to lawful conduct. Disciplinary Rule 7-102 of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY
(1980), entitled "Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law," provides:
"(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
...
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
•.. (7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent."
Similarly, the more recent MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) provides:
"Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation
...(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent ...."
Moreover, both codes require the disclosure of perjury even ifthe disclosure compromises the client's confidence. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4- 101 (c) (3) (1980); MODEL
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purported to immunize those officials who ignore limitations on their authority imposed by law. 69 Consequently, by failing to examine Marcus'

actions in terms of scope of authority, the Barrett court did not satisfy the
threshold issue of the two-step inquiry and should not have granted Mar70
cus any immunity.
B.

Misapplication of the Supreme Court's FunctionalAnalysis

Even if Marcus had acted within the scope of his authority, he was
not entitled to absolute immunity. Courts generally hold that qualified
immunity provides sufficient protection for most government officials. 71
Absolute immunity is limited to the "rare and exceptional" 72 circumstances where public policy considerations outweigh the plaintiff's interest in access to the courts. Thus, the decision to grant absolute immunity
73
depends on a balancing test.
This balancing test for absolute immunity does not depend on the
official's job title, rank, or branch of government. 74 Rather, the Supreme
Court has developed a test which examines the specific function the offiRuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983). The Supreme Court recognized these limitations
on advocacy in Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 995 (1986), stating that: "[A]n attorney's ethical
duty to advance the interests of his client is limited by an equally solemn duty to comply with the law
and standards of professional conduct; [the standards] specifically [ensure] that the client may not
use false evidence." The Court reasoned that the prevention and disclosure of fraud was necessary
for the administration of justice. Id. at 996.
69 Butz, 438 U.S. at 489-94. In Butz, the Supreme Court inferred from its previous decisions in
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), and Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), supra note 40, that
an official will not be excused from liability "if he failed to observe obvious statutory or constitutional limitations on his powers or if his conduct was a manifestly erroneous application of the statute." Butz, 438 U.S. at 494.
70 Judicial integrity requires that Marcus not be granted absolute immunity. As Justice White
explained in his concurring opinion in Imbler, 424 U.S. at 432 (White, J., concurring), absolute immunity in the context of suits charging suppression of evidence is not necessary nor even helpful in
protecting the judicial process. Absolute immunity is designed in part to encourage the production
of evidence. See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), supra note 46. In Briscoe, the Court
held that a witness has absolute immunity from § 1983 liability based on the substance of his trial
testimony. The Court expressly limited this immunity to testimony given in judicial proceedings in
order to encourage witnesses to testify completely and to the best of their knowledge. The Second
Circuit recognized this reasoning in San Filippo v. United States Trust Co. of N.Y., Inc., 737 F.2d
246, 254 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985) stating that "no court has yet held that
absolute immunity from prosecution for false testimony extends to conspiracy with public officials to
present false testimony." Accord Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 994 (1986) ("Plainly .... [counsel's] duty is limited to legitimate lawful conduct compatible with the very nature of a trial as a search
for truth."). Absolute immunity, however, is no longer beneficial when the information is withheld
from the fact-finder. In the context of suppressing or witholding information, immunity would discourage precisely the disclosure of evidence that was encouraged by giving prosecutors immunity.
Correspondingly, denying immunity in this context would encourage such disclosure.
71 "Our cases make plain that [for executive officers in general] qualified immunity represents
the norm." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. The most recent statement of this principle appears in Malley
v. Briggs, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986) ("As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides
ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.").
Courts prefer qualified immunity because, ideally, it shields officials from non-meritorious claims
without denying redress through the courts for legitimate claims. See infra notes 108-21 and accompanying text. See alsoButz, 438 U.S. at 507-08.
72 Cleavinger v. Saxner, 106 S. Ct. 496, 501 (1986).
73 "The resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-14.
74 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (1985). See supra note 76.
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cial was performing at the time of the alleged unconstitutional act. 75
Courts use this "functional analysis" to limit the grant of absolute immunity to those few job functions which actually require such broad protection. 76 In order to qualify for absolute immunity, a state official "must
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption"
77
from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct.
In Mitchell v. Forsyth,78 the Supreme Court balanced these interests
by conducting the functional analysis in terms of three specific factors:
(1) whether a historical or common law basis exists for the immunity in
question; (2) whether the performance of the function subjects the official to the same obvious risks of vexatious litigation as does the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions; and (3) whether the official
performing the function at issue is subject to other checks that help prevent abuses of authority from going unredressed. 7 9 The Barrett court
purported to follow the Mitchell analysis.8 0 Balancing the relevant factors, however, reveals that the function performed by Marcus, defending
the state in a civil tort suit, is not a "special function" for which public
policy requires absolute immunity.8s
Applying the first factor in the Mitchell analysis, the Barrett court
found a historical and common law basis for extending absolute immu75 "[A]n executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be justified by reference to the
public interest in the special functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station." Harlow, 457
U.S. at 812. See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 342 ("The common law principles and public policy considerations of immunity analysis rest on functional categories, not on the status of the defendant.");
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
76 Past cases make the distinction between type of function and type of official very clear. See e.g.,
Butz, 438 U.S. at 511 ("In each case where a governmental offical has claimed that he is entitled to
governmental immunity we rely not on that official's position in the government, but on the examination of the nature of the function he was performing in the case."); Mitchell, 105 S. Ct. at 2813
("Our decisions in this area leave no doubt that the Attorney General's status as a Cabinet officer is
not in itself sufficient to invest him with absolute immunity...."); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 57374 (1959) (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)) ("It is not the title of his office but
the duties with which the particular officer sought to be made to respond in damages is entrustedthe relation of the act complained of to 'matters committed by law to his control or supervision,'
which must provide the guide in delineating the scope of the rule which clothes the official acts of the
executive officer with immunity .... ").
77 Butz, 438 U.S. at 506. See supra note 48.
78 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985). See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
79 Id. at 2812-14. Throughout its analysis of these factors, the Court emphasized that the grant
of absolute immunity depends on the specific function the official was performing at the time of the
allegedly unconstitutional act. The fact that the Attorney General would be absolutely immune
when performing the prosecutorial function did not determine the degree of immunity governing
any other function within his scope of duties:
Mitchell's claim, then, must rest not on the Attorney General's position within the Executive Branch, but on the nature of the functions he was performing in this case. Because
Mitchell was not acting in a prosecutorial capacity in this case, the situations in which we
have applied a functional approach to absolute immunity questions provides scant support
for blanket immunization of his performance of the "national security function."
Id. at 2813 (citations omitted). Since Marcus was not performing the function of a prosecutor, common law cases granting absolute immunity to prosecutors cannot provide a basis for his claim for
absolute immunity. See also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (Senators and their
aides held absolutely immune only when performing "acts legislative in nature," and not when performing other acts even "in their official capacity."); Butz, 438 U.S. at 507-08.
80 Barrett, 798 F.2d at 571-73.
81 Absolute immunity applies only to "those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that
absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business." Butz, 438 U.S. at 507.
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nity to Marcus. 8 2 But no common law or historical basis exists to afford
absolute immunity to an attorney defending the state against a civil suit.
At common law, sovereign immunity completely shielded the state from
tort liability.8 3 Attorneys general performed prosecutorial functions and
brought actions against citizens to enforce the state's laws.8 4 Since states

did not employ attorneys to defend civil suits, there is no common law
role analogous to that performed by Marcus.
Because no common law basis exists for affording a defense attorney
absolute immunity, the Barrett court found it necessary to use absolute
prosecutorial immunity as one basis for granting immunity to Marcus.8 5
The court compared a prosecutor to a government attorney defending a
civil suit, and concluded that Marcus' function was enough like the
prosecutorial function to require absolute immunity.8 6 This comparison
ignores the rationale underlying prosecutorial absolute immunity as articulated by the Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman.s7 In Imbler, the
Court granted absolute immunity to state prosecuting attorneys acting
within the scope of their duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal pros88
ecution and in presenting the state's case against a criminal defendant.
82 Barrett, 798 F.2d at 571-73.
83 "Though the notion of sovereign immunity might seem best suited to a government of royal
power, the doctrine was nevertheless accepted by American judges in the early days of the republic,
and the law of the United States has ever since been that, except to the extent the government
consents to suit, it is immune." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OwEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS § 131, at 1033 (5th Ed. 1984).
84 See 3 BLAcK. COM. 256-57, 260-66; People v. Ingersoll, 58 N.Y. 1, 17 Am. Rep. 178 (1874). See
also People v. Hopkins, 182 Misc. 313, 47 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1944) ("The duties, obligations and authority of the attorney general are those specifically set forth by statutes."). Attorneys general have been
held absolutely immune when acting outside their prosecutorial capacity but within their statutory
authority. Mother Goose Nursery Schools, Inc. v. Sendak, 770 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 884 (1986) (Indiana Attorney General required by state law to review state contracts held absolutely immune for unconstitutional acts in the course of doing so.); Campbell v.
Patterson, 724 F.2d 41, 43 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1107 (1984) (Michigan
Attorney General obligated by statute to render opinions interpreting law at the request of state
agencies was granted immunity for errors arising out of this function.).
85 Barrett, 798 F.2d at 572.
86 Id. at 571-72. The Barrett court did not initially subject Marcus to the Mitchell test. Instead,
the court analogized Marcus' function to that of the prosecutor, and applied the test to the
prosecutorial function. Only after attempting this comparison did the court purport to apply the test
to Marcus.

87 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
88 "Attaining the system's goal of accurately determining guilt or innocence requires that both
the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in the conduct of the trial and the presentation
of evidence." Id. at 426. See supra note 51. The function of a prosecutor in initiating and pursuing a
criminal prosecution is often described as "quasi-judicial." Id. at 423 n.20. The Barrett court interpreted the term "quasi-judicial" to include all activities related to the conduct of litigation. Barrett,
798 F.2d at 572. This interpretation extends existing precedent. The cases which use the term
address only criminal prosecutions and proceedings which closely resemble criminal prosecutions.
See Butz, 438 U.S. at 515-17 (administrative proceedings); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426; McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 904 (1978) (absolute immunity under Imbler extends only so far as necessary to protect a
prosecutor's decision with respect to the initiation and conduct of particular criminal cases.); Yaselli
v. Goff, 12 F.2d 369, 404 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd mem., 275 U.S. 503 (1927) ("The public prosecutor, in
deciding whether a particular prosecution shall be instituted or followed up, performs much the
same function as a grand jury."). See supra notes 38-39. Cf Cleavinger v. Saxner, 106 S. Ct. 496
(1985) (members of federal prison's Institution Discipline Committee entitled only to qualified immunity). The public prosecutor has a direct responsibility to the public to prosecute criminals and
enforce criminal laws. The attorney defending the state in a civil suit has only an indirect responsi-
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The Court focused on the prosecutor's role in the criminal justice system
and the concern that civil suits would divert the prosecutor's attention
from the duty of enforcing the criminal law.8 9 Marcus, however, was not
performing a prosecutorial function, but was defending the state in a civil
action. The interests implicated by his activities differ greatly from the
criminal justice interests implicated by the prosecutorial function.
Therefore, absolute prosecutorial immunity cannot provide a common
law basis for affording Marcus absolute immunity under the first factor in
the Mitchell analysis.
In addressing the second prong of the Mitchell analysis, the Barrett
court acknowledged that the risk of vexatious litigation against Marcus, a
defense attorney, was less than it would be in situations where a government attorney instituted suit.90 Nonetheless, the Barrett court decided
that plaintiffs who are angered or offended by the assertion of affirmative
defenses pose a risk of retaliatory lawsuits. 9 1 Thus, the court found that
92
Marcus had fulfilled his burden of proof on this factor.
The court's analysis of the second factor in Mitchell was incomplete.
The court failed to balance the interests involved 93 and instead assumed
that the analysis was complete once it determined that the official showed
some risk of vexatious litigation. When utilizing a balancing test, the results of the test change as the weight of various factors change. When
the risk of vexatious litigation is reduced, society's interest in affording
absolute immunity is reduced. As a result, interests on the other side of
the balance weigh more heavily. Applying this test to the facts in Barrett
reveals that the risk of vexatious litigation is small, and the countervailing
considerations against absolute immunity are great.
The Barrett court compared Marcus' function to a prosecutor's function and found that, like a prosecutor, Marcus was subject to a risk of
vexatious litigation. 9 4 The initial common law basis for prosecutorial absolute immunity was to protect prosecutors from malicious prosecution
bility to the public to protect taxpayers from paying for judgments against the state. "The public
generally has a lesser interest in ensuring that the prosecutor is not deterred from enforcing the civil
law than it does as respects the criminal law." Martin Hodas, E. Coast Cinematics v. Lindsay, 431 F.
Supp. 637, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
89 The public policy underlying prosecutorial absolute immunity serves to "insulate prosecutors
from unfounded, retaliatory lawsuits by angry defendants: such lawsuits would deter vigorous prosecution of cases, deflect prosecutors energies, and ultimately harm the judicial process." Joseph v.
Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 1986). See also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-25 ("Further, if the
prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time such a person charged him with wrongdoing,
his energy and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law.");
Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 164 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
90 Barrett, 798 F.2d at 572.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 No single factor is determinative.
[T]he recognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives reflected an attempt
to balance competing values: not only the importance of a damages remedy to protect the
rights of citizens ... but also "the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their
discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official
authority."
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 504-06).
94 Barrett, 798 F.2d at 572-73.
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suits.95 This justification is not relevant when the government does not
initiate the suit.9 6 A defense attorney does not prosecute the plaintiff.
Further, malicious prosecution suits are likely to arise from the strong
97
sense of personal moral outrage engendered by a criminal prosecution.
In contrast, the risk of such an intense emotional reaction to an asserted
affirmative defense is small. Thus, any risk of retaliatory suits against an
individual performing a civil defense function is minimal.
In analyzing the second factor in Mitchell, the Barrett court also failed
to consider the nature of Marcus' conduct. When alleged unconstitutional conduct consists of concealing facts or taking private action to

deceive, litigation regarding the conduct is unlikely.9 8 Significantly, the
95 See supra note 89 and infra note 97.
96 Although it is obvious the risk of suit to a civil attorney defending the state does not implicate
the concerns of the criminal system, the Barrett court puts a great deal of emphasis on the term
"advocate," as used in Butz, to justify granting Marcus absolute immunity for the function he was
performing. Barrett, 798 F.2d at 572. Butz, however, did not use this term as an extension of the
normal immunity afforded to prosecutors performing prosecutorial functions. The Court used the
term because the officials who initiated the action for violation of the Department of Agriculture's
statutes were not technically prosecutors, but were administrative attorneys and judges. However,
upon conducting the functional analysis, the Butz Court concluded that their functions were analogous to those of prosecutors because they initiated proceedings against people who offended statutory law. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 515-17. See also supra note 48.
97 A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in deciding which suits to
bring and conducting them in court. The public trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer
if he were constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own
potential liability in a suit for damages. Such suits could be expected with some frequency,
for a defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription
of improper and malicious actions to the State's advocate.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-25. See also Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd men., 275 U.S.
503 (1927), supra notes 38-39; Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872), supra note 36.
98 In Mitchell, Attorney GeneralJohn Mitchell authorized a warrantless wiretap allegedly in violation of the fourth amendment and the Omnibus Crime Control Act. 105 S.Ct. at 2810. Mitchell
justified the wiretap on national security grounds. The Mitchell Court applied the three factor functional analysis and denied absolute immunity to Mitchell, a United States Attorney General acting in
the interest of national security. First, Mitchell had cited no common law or historical basis for
granting absolute immunity to an official performing a national security function. Second, the Court
noted that "[n]ational security tasks ... are carried out in secret .... Id. at 2813. Therefore, the
risk of vexatious litigation is small: "[It is far more likely that actual abuses will go uncovered than
that fancied abuses will give rise to unfounded and burdensome litigation." Id. Finally, the Court
found an absence of checks on the exercise of the national security function, and concluded that
"[t]he danger that high federal officials will disregard constitutional rights in their zeal to protect the
national security is sufficiently real to counsel against affording such officials an absolute immunity."
Id. at 2814.
Irrespective of the Mitchell three factor analysis, the holding in Mitchell should prevent absolute
immunity for Marcus. Marcus and the federal attorneys involved believed that they were performing
a national security function by hiding the Army Chemical Corps' involvement in Blauer's death. By
threatening Marcus with prosecution under the Espionage Act, the federal attorneys indicated their
belief that national security necessitated the "cover up." Marcus convinced the Court of Claims
judge in the 1953 suit that national security required continuing secrecy regarding the purpose of
th6 experiment and the circumstances surrounding Blauer's death. See also Barrett v. United States,
689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1982). Like Mitchell, Marcus cited no common law or historical basis to
support a grant of absolute immunity to a state attorney general performing a national security
function. Like Mitchell, Marcus performed his tasks in secret, thus making the risk of vexatious suits
for such actions almost non-existent, and the risk of undiscovered abuses severe. Finally, Marcus,
like Mitchell, disregarded constitutional rights in his desire to protect national security. The fact that
Marcus' allegedly inconstitutional conduct was neither discovered nor challenged until the commencement of the Barrett suit points to an obvious lack of restraints on an assistant attorney general
performing a national security function. This also parallels the lack of sufficient alternative restraints
on the United States Attorney General's performance of the national security function. The reasoning followed by the Mitchell Court in determining that the United States Attorney General is not
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Mitchell court found that tasks performed in secret create the risk that
abuses will remain undiscovered rather than a risk of vexatious litigation. 9 9 Since Marcus performed the challenged conduct secretly, Barrett
calls for a similar result.
The Barrett court also examined the third factor of the Mitchell analysis (availability of alternative remedies) in terms of the perceived similarity between Marcus' function and the prosecutorial function. 0 0 The
Barrett court simply stated that an alternative remedy for abuse exists in
the availability of professional disciplinary proceedings.' 0 ' The court
02
granted Marcus absolute immunity based in part on this assertion.
A prosecutor fulfills the third Mitchell factor because the criminal defendant has the alternative remedies of appeal, release on habeas corpus,
and administrative discipline against the prosecutor involved.' 0 3 However, the argument that victims of unconstitutional conduct by prosecutors have alternative remedies does not apply to a civil case. These
alternative remedies are of little worth to plaintiffs who seek civil redress
for a government official's misconduct in the defense of a civil case which
deprives them of their property rights. 10 4 First, an appeal will not provide an effective remedy. In a case where evidence is suppressed, the
gravamen of the aggrieved party's complaint is that essential evidence
could not be considered by the lower court because the evidence was
suppressed.' 0 5 The appellate court cannot review what does not appear
on the record from the court below. Second, a writ of habeas corpus is
simply irrelevant in a civil case where the aggrieved party has not been
deprived of liberty. 10 6 Finally, a disciplinary action against the government official does nothing to compensate the estate for what it has suffered-the loss of a property right due to the arbitrary conduct of the
official. The aggrieved party thus has no remedy but damages for the
7
0
property lost.'

C. An Objective Standard
The Barrett court's extension of immunity might suggest that the
Second Circuit endowed government attorneys with more immunity than
they enjoyed even at common law. The Barrett decision, however, probaentitled to absolute immunity when performing a national security function parallels the reasoning
the Barrett court should have used.
99 Mitchell, 105 S. Ct. at 2813.
100 Barrett, 798 F.2d at 573.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 572-73.
103 Further, "a prosecutor stands perhaps unique among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an association of his
peers." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429.
104 Remedies like those available in criminal cases "are useless where a citizen not accused of any
crime has been subjected to a completed constitutional violation." In such cases, "it is damages or
nothing." Mitchell, 105 S. Ct. at 2814 n.7 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971)). See also Butz, 438 U.S. at 506 ("In situations of abuse
of office, an action for damages against the responsible official can be an important means of vindicating Constitutional guarantees.").
105 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
107 Id.
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bly does not reach so far. Rather than refusing immunity to an attorney
who was involved in litigation, the court took the more established route
of denying immunity to attorneys who were not involved in the litigation.1 0 8 The court, however, failed to consider the reduced necessity of
absolute immunity under a recent Supreme Court decision, Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.10 9 Harlow eliminated the policy reasons in favor of absolute
immunity as opposed to qualified immunity in all but the most compelling situations. 110
In Harlow, the Supreme Court fundamentally altered the qualified
immunity defense available to government officials. After Harlow, government officials are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."'' This
decision created a purely objective standard, a significant departure from
prior law. Previously, a plaintiff could rebut a defendant's qualified immunity defense by introducing evidence showing the defendant lacked
the requisite "permissible intentions" 1 12 or good faith."13 Courts considered this subjective element a question of fact inherently requiring
resolution by thejury. 1 14 The obligatory fact-finding associated with this
subjective element effectively precluded any possibility of resolving insubstantial claims on summary disposition. 1 5 Thus, the subjective element of good faith carried with it substantial costs. The risks of trial
distracted them from their official duties, inhibited discretionary action,
and deterred people from public service."16
108 The Barrett court rejected the federal attorneys' claim of absolute immunity because the attorneys did not act as counsel for any of the parties in the litigation. The attorneys primarily attempted
to avoid the involvement of the federal government. According to the court, their actions went
beyond the outer boundary of the absolute protection afforded government attorneys defending
civil suits. Id. See also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812 ("[Ain executive official's claim to absolute immunity
must be justified by reference to the public interest in the special functions of his office, not the mere
fact of high station.").
109 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Even though Harlow involved a violation of constitutional rights by
presidential aides, it is nonetheless relevant to Barrett. The Supreme Court has stated that it would
be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." Butz, 438 U.S. at 504 (1978). See supra note 57.
110 See supra note 89.
111 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
112 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975).
113 See Friedman, The Good Faith Defense in ConstitutionalLitigation, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 501, 511-12
(1977) (discussing the ambiguity of the good faith requirement).
114 See, e.g., Harlow, 456 U.S. at 814; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419 ("The fate of an official with qualified
immunity depends upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions as established by the evidence at trial.").
115 Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary judgment if "there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." The operation of this rule in immunity cases is not altered by Harlow. Rather, the
Harlow court refashioned the immunity defense to avoid routine conflict with Rule 56. Consequently, the potential for factual disputes is significantly reduced under the objective test. See supra
notes 33-35. See, e.g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1329 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912
(1978); Duchesse v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 823-33 (2d Cir. 1977).
116 Harlow, 456 U.S. at 814. Accord Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974); Barr v. Matteo,
360 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1959); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 949 (1950). See also Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard
for QualifiedImmunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 913-15 (1984) (discussing qualified
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The Harlow court consciously sought to avoid these costs by focusing on the violation of a "clearly established" right and foreclosing inquiry into an official's state of mind. This approach transformed the
and fact to a
issue of qualified immunity from a mixed question of law
117
pure question of law amenable to summary disposition.
The Barrett court should have considered this effect of the Harlow
decision. Instead, the Barrett court advanced the same argument in justifying its grant of absolute immunity that the Supreme Court had rejected
in Harlow.'1 8 Specifically, the Barrett court cited the risk of vexatious litigation against the government attorney by a dissatisfied plaintiff." 19 This
risk, the court argued, could inhibit the attorney general's faithful performance of duties, thus violating his public trust.' 20 However, Harlow
radically reduced this risk by providing a means for the dismissal of insubstantial litigation on a motion for summary disposition. 12 1 Consequently, these vexatious lawsuits no longer carry the same costs as they
did prior to Harlow. Thus, the need to insulate government attorneys
with absolute immunity should rarely be necessary. Rather, the attorney
general defending a civil suit should only be given qualified immunity.
IV.

Conclusion

In Barrett, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an
assistant attorney general defending a state in a civil action was entitled
to absolute immunity. The Barrett court erred for three reasons. First,
the court failed to address the issue of whether Assistant Attorney General Marcus acted within the scope of his authority. Second, the court
misapplied the functional analysis articulated by the Supreme Court to
determine whether the official was performing a "special function" requiring absolute immunity. Third, qualified immunity, as determined by
immunity and the competing goals of compensation, deterrence, and official liability in civil rights
litigation).
117 In order to facilitate summary disposition of insubstantial claims against government officials,
appellate review of a denial of a motion for summary disposition is available. Mitchell, 105 S. Ct. at
2816-17 ("Denial of a claim of qualified immunity ... is an 'appealable final decision' within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .... "). This procedure ensures that government officials are fully
protected against unnecessary trials under qualified immunity on the same basis as for absolute immunity. McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Alternatively, in circuits not
recognizing this procedure, litigants can use 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)'s certification procedure. McSurely,
697 F.2d at 316 n. 12. This section permits a district court to certify an order for appellate review if
the court is:
[O]f the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation .... [We] may thereupon,
in [our] discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order ... [pfrovided, however,
[t]hat application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court
unless the district judge or [this court] shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (Supp. III 1986) (emphasis in original). See also Katz v. Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d
747, 753-56 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
118 Harlow, 456 U.S. at 816. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
119 Barrett, 798 F.2d at 572.
120 Id. at 572-73.
121 For purposes of review, no reason exists to distinguish between summary judgment and dismissal under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Both raise the question whether a public official
is immune from suit as a matter of law.
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Harlow's objective test, adequately protects state officials from litigation
challenging discretionary actions and deters unconstitutional or illegal
conduct.
Absolute immunity has the drastic effect of defeating all claims
against immune officials. Plaintiffs with meritorious claims against immune officials are denied their only means of civil redress. The risks associated with defending a state in a civil case do not justify absolute
immunity. The Barrett court's grant of absolute immunity shielded Marcus from ever answering for his possibly unconstitutional or illegal behavior at the expense of denying Elizabeth Barrett access to the courts to
redress claims arising from her father's death. The facts of Barrett illustrate the extreme misconduct and injury that may result when a government official is allowed to escape responsibility for his tortious and
unconstitutional actions.
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